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Abstract 
 
Most parties with an interest in UK tax law appear to be able to agree on one thing: it is 
complex. Surveys show that the UK tax code is now the longest in the world, having recently 
overtaken India to claim that dubious title. It is equally the case that the amount, as well as the 
complexity of the legislation, increases every year, leading to increasing compliance costs for 
business. 
One of the more stimulating tax debates of recent years in the UK has been over the merits of 
a flat tax. While to date the debate has focussed more on issues such as a potential economic 
stimulus on the introduction of such a tax, an important claim of flat tax supporters is that its 
introduction would simplify the current UK tax legislation. 
There would therefore appear to be a clear and worthwhile link to explore between the 
complexity of the UK tax legislation and whether a flat tax might reduce it. However, little 
work has been performed to date on investigating such a link, either at a theoretical level or 
by considering data from countries that have introduced tax systems described as flat taxes. 
This might seem surprising considering the current substantial costs to business in complying 
with the UK tax legislation. The exploration of this link is the key focus behind this thesis. 
This thesis only considers the case of corporation tax from among all the UK taxes due to 
time and length constraints. Many other countries have similar taxes known as ‘corporate 
income tax (CIT)’, which is levied mainly on companies, as opposed to ‘personal income tax 
(PIT)’, levied mainly on individuals. Where this thesis refers to ‘income tax’ this should be 
taken to refer to the latter, in line with current UK practice. 
The thesis starts with a brief introduction to UK corporation tax and the theoretical 
background to a generic corporation tax. It then considers the nature of the current UK tax 
legislation and its apparent complexity, before looking at the corporation tax compliance costs 
incurred by UK business. 
The fundamental issue of complexity of a tax system is a topic of sufficient magnitude to 
merit its own chapter, followed by a detailed examination of the concept of ‘flat tax’, 
considering both the theoretical Hall-Rabushka (HR) model and the real-life Eastern 
European flat taxes introduced. Potential simplifications for the UK of a flat tax are then 
considered, followed by evidence as to why a flat tax would not be the simplifying force that 
might be hoped. 
The final two chapters consider real-life evidence and data, factors conspicuously absent in 
the UK flat tax debate to date. Evidence from those countries, mainly from Eastern Europe, 
that have introduced flat tax systems is considered, followed by a case study covering the 
proposed recent changes to the UK’s capital gains tax and the lessons it provides for any 
simplifying tax reform. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
A. Purpose of the research 
 
The inspiration for this research came from the recent popularity of the concept of ‘flat tax’ in 
debates about the UK tax system and its potential reform. Claims of flat tax’s simplifying 
properties made by its supporters seemed to make a positive contribution into the ongoing 
debate about the apparent complexity of the UK tax system involving government, the tax 
profession and taxpayers. Given the recent emergence of the topic, significant gaps in the 
academic literature of flat tax simplification exist, the filling of which this work hoped to be 
able to contribute. 
B. Importance 
 
Most parties with an interest in UK tax law and the wider tax system appear to be able to 
agree on one thing: they are complex. Surveys show that the UK tax code is now the longest 
in the world, having recently overtaken India to claim that dubious title. It is equally the case 
that the amount, as well as the complexity of the legislation, increases every year, leading to 
increasing compliance costs for taxpayers. 
One of the more stimulating tax debates of recent years in the UK has been over the merits of 
a flat tax. While to date the debate has focussed more on issues such as a potential economic 
stimulus on the introduction of such a tax, an important claim of flat tax supporters is that its 
introduction would simplify the current UK tax legislation. 
There would therefore appear to be a clear and worthwhile link to explore between the 
complexity of the UK tax legislation and whether a flat tax might reduce it. However, little 
work has been performed to date on investigating such a link, either at a theoretical level or 
by considering data from countries that have introduced tax systems described as flat taxes. 
This might seem surprising considering the current substantial costs to taxpayers in 
complying with the UK tax legislation. The exploration of this link is the key focus behind 
this thesis. 
This thesis only considers the case of corporation tax from among all the UK taxes due to 
time and length constraints, as well as this particular tax being the author’s area of practical 
expertise. Many other countries have similar taxes known as ‘corporate income tax (CIT)’, 
which is levied mainly on companies, as opposed to ‘personal income tax (PIT)’, levied 
mainly on individuals. Where this thesis refers to ‘income tax’ this should be taken to refer to 
the latter, in line with current UK practice. 
C. Methodology 
 
In keeping with the requirements of the research degree for which the thesis is submitted, the 
research is based on a review of all the available literature. This includes papers from 
academic journals, as well as a wide range of other sources such as the professional tax press 
and reports commissioned by think-tanks and a number of other bodies. Some criticism and 
analysis of the literature from the author’s own practical experience has also been included 
where appropriate.  
D. Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis starts with a brief introduction to UK corporation tax and the theoretical 
background to a generic corporation tax. It then considers the nature of the current UK tax 
legislation and its apparent complexity, before looking at the corporation tax compliance costs 
incurred by UK business. 
The fundamental issue of complexity of a tax system is a topic of sufficient magnitude to 
merit its own chapter, followed by a detailed examination of the concept of ‘flat tax’, 
considering both the theoretical Hall-Rabushka (HR) model and the real-life Eastern 
European flat taxes introduced. Potential simplifications for the UK of a flat tax are then 
considered, followed by evidence as to why a flat tax would not be the simplifying force that 
might be hoped. 
The final two chapters consider real-life evidence and data, factors conspicuously absent in 
the UK flat tax debate to date. Evidence from those countries, mainly from Eastern Europe, 
that have introduced flat tax systems is considered, followed by a case study covering the 
proposed recent changes to the UK’s capital gains tax and the lessons it provides for any 
simplifying tax reform. 
E. Contribution of the research 
 
The most immediate result of the research was the presentation of a paper based on its 
findings at the 2009 IRS Annual Research Conference in Washington DC (subsequently 
published as Jelfs & Lymer, 2009). The paper was thus entirely based on the work of the 
author of this thesis. 
The research has subsequently been presented in the UK professional press in Tax Adviser 
magazine, thus achieving recognition on both sides of the Atlantic. 
As noted above, in the longer term, the research helps to fill a gap in the academic literature 
on the analysis of the link between flat tax and tax simplification. Flat tax appears to come to 
prominence on a fairly cyclical basis, and it is to be hoped that this research will be cited 
during its next appearance. 
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  UK Corporation Tax 
1. UK Corporation Tax 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter gives a very brief overview of UK corporation tax and the two different systems 
used since its inception. It then considers corporation tax on a more fundamental and largely 
theoretical level, looking at the need for such a tax, its incidence, the special case of small 
companies and inherent complexities. 
 
1.2 Brief history of UK corporation tax 
 
Until the First World War, companies in the UK were taxed under the provisions of the 
income tax in the same way as individuals. They were taxed separately from 1915 to 1924 
and then again from 1937 onwards (James & Nobes, 1999). 
UK companies are separate legal entities from their owners. During the nineteenth century, 
successive governments passed laws which gave companies a range of powers. These 
included perpetual succession as independent legal entities, the ability to sue and be sued in 
their own name and removal of the liability of owners for the debts of the company beyond 
their capital contributions i.e. shareholders have ‘limited liability’.  
As an illustration of this separation between companies and shareholders, in the twentieth 
century companies and individuals started to be taxed differently. The driving force behind 
the changes was the need to finance rearmament spending for the two World Wars. A new 
profits tax was introduced in 1937 under the name of ‘national defence contribution’ in 
addition to the existing income tax levied on companies’ income. 
In 1965 the Labour government introduced the corporation tax which replaced both income 
tax and profits tax previously paid by companies. The new tax was chargeable on a 
company’s chargeable profits i.e. its taxable income and capital gains. Among other 
objectives, the change gave government more flexibility to target either companies or 
unincorporated businesses with tax reforms. 
Since its inception, corporation tax in the UK has been subject to many reforms. It has also 
been analysed on a more fundamental level, most notably in the Meade Report (1978), and 
more recently in the Mirrlees Review (2009), whose remit is ‘to identify the characteristics of 
a good tax system for any open developed economy in the 21st century, to assess the extent to 
which the UK tax system conforms to these ideals, and to recommend how it might 
realistically be reformed in that direction’. 
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1.3 Scope and administration of UK corporation tax 
 
Corporation tax is controlled, as other UK taxes, by statute, case law and prevailing practices 
of HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC). Annual Finance Acts, which introduce tax changes, are 
the codification of Budgets and Pre-Budget Reports. HMRC may also issue guidelines or 
changes of interpretation at any time during the year. The due legal process of tax reform is 
considered in more depth in a later chapter. 
The tax is chargeable on bodies corporate (UK resident companies and permanent 
establishments of non-UK resident companies that are trading in the UK) and unincorporated 
associations such as trade associations and members’ clubs. It is not generally chargeable on 
partnerships, individuals, unincorporated businesses, most charities or local authorities. 
Corporation tax is assessed under different schedules and cases depending on the nature of the 
income and is chargeable on a current year basis for a ‘chargeable accounting period’, usually 
the company’s accounting period. The rate of tax to be used for each fiscal year (1 April to 31 
March for companies) is laid down in statute. 
 
1.4 Systems of corporation tax used in the UK 
 
A number of different systems of corporation tax exist to deal with the difficult issue of the 
taxation of a company’s profits. Companies that make profits either retain them or distribute 
them as dividends to their shareholders. If profits are only taxed on distribution, they could be 
retained in the company and tax could be postponed indefinitely. Where they are only taxed 
in the company, all shareholders would suffer the same rate of tax which does not fit well 
with the philosophy of a progressive income tax system, such as that in the UK. If they are 
taxed both in the company when earned and on the shareholder when distributed, economic 
double taxation occurs which may be both inefficient and inequitable. Economic theory 
suggests that a good system of corporation tax should be as efficient as possible i.e. revenue 
should be raised with minimum distortions to economic behaviour. 
As a result of this dilemma, different countries have created different systems of corporation 
tax ranging from the classical to full relief, where the company is merely a conduit for 
corporate equity income taxed at the marginal income tax rate of the shareholder for 
distributed profits. There are also intermediate systems with some relief for shareholders of 
corporation tax on distributed profits, usually via a partial imputation system. 
 
In the UK both classical and partial imputation systems have been used, and are further 
described below. 
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1.4.1 Classical system 
 
Under the classical system of corporation tax, a company is treated as an entity in its own 
right and is taxed completely separately from individuals: both distributed and undistributed 
profits are taxed in the same way. Profits distributed as dividends are subject to corporation 
tax in the company and then income tax in the hands of the shareholder at his individual 
income tax  rate.  
James & Nobes (1999) note that this double taxation may be considered inequitable when 
compared to drawings from an unincorporated business which do not suffer corporation tax. 
A number of other arguments against the classical system exist. Opponents of double taxation 
consider that it is inefficient as it influences companies not to pay dividends due to the heavy 
tax bill. Supporters of the classical system claim it encourages companies to invest since 
retained profits are taxed less heavily than distributed profits, while opponents point out that 
companies may not reinvest their profits wisely, and it is likely to be in their own business, 
whereas shareholders may reinvest their dividends in other companies with higher returns. 
However, it is unproven that companies with a good earnings record remain the most 
profitable (Whittington, 1971). In addition, companies may not actually retain more profits 
under this system as they may feel obliged to pay dividends anyway to meet shareholders’ 
income requirements. Finally, low payouts may reduce capital in the market to invest in new, 
growing companies which are likely to be efficient and innovative. Opponents conclude that 
the classical system may encourage investment but it is not necessarily good quality 
investment.  
However, James & Nobes (1999) comment that even if there were no corporation tax on 
distributed income, there would still be a bias against distribution if there were an income tax 
paid only when dividends were distributed. Partington and Chenhall (1983) have also argued 
for this reason that the burden of double taxation is not as serious as it may seem. The tax 
position for companies and shareholders is complicated by many factors including capital 
gains taxes or lack of them on increase in share values arising from retained profits, from 
different tax treatment of foreign investment by different countries and different tax bases in 
different countries. 
Opponents of reform of a classical system have also in the past pointed out that any double 
taxation effect is likely to have been capitalised in a lowering of share prices and that giving 
dividend relief would be an unjustified bonus to existing shareholders e.g. Meade (1978). 
 
1.4.2 Imputation system 
 
Due to the perceived unfavourable characteristics of the classical system, the UK moved from 
a classical to an imputation system in 1973. An imputation system mitigates double taxation 
by imputing to shareholders who receive dividends some or all of the tax paid by the 
company and allowing a tax credit to reduce or remove their tax liability. 
The UK’s current imputation system is a partial imputation system where only part of the 
corporation tax paid by the company is imputed to the shareholders. This can remove double 
taxation and the bias against distribution where the tax credit cancels the personal liability, 
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which is currently the case for basic rate taxpayers. A full imputation system would also act to 
remove double taxation. 
 
1.5 Need for a corporation tax 
 
On a more fundamental level, there is ongoing debate as to whether a corporation tax is 
necessary in a tax system. On first principles, a real life corporation tax system can have a 
number of goals; some of these were identified as follows in the US General Accounting 
Office (GAO) report of 1998: 
 
• Raising revenue for government spending 
• Redistributing income 
• Stabilising the economy 
• Achieving other social and economic objectives through the use of preferences 
 
The greater the number of goals, the more complicated the tax system. 
 
However, on a theoretical level the need for a corporation tax in a tax system is not an 
obvious one. Under an income based tax system, corporation tax may be seen as simply the 
integration of corporate source income with personal income tax, or alternatively as an 
additional ‘absolute’ tax. Proposals to integrate corporation tax and income tax were 
considered but rejected both in the USA during the 1986 tax reforms and by the 1978 Meade 
Report in the UK. 
As noted above, Meade (1978) highlighted the argument that since corporation tax exists, it 
should not be removed since this would be a windfall benefit to shareholders who are already 
used to the tax. On a fundamental level, it is clear that companies need to be taxed in some 
form or there would be inequality with unincorporated businesses. 
There are two main opposing views on the need for a corporation tax which were designated 
by Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) as integrationist and absolutist. 
 
1.5.1. Integrationist view 
 
The guiding principle behind this view is that all taxes must be borne ultimately by 
individuals and hence equitable taxation can only apply to individuals. Income should 
therefore be taxed as a whole regardless of its source. Holders of this view are critical of the 
double taxation arising under the classical system of corporation tax and consider that the 
extra tax is unjustified as all income (including corporate profits) should be taxed at the same 
rate. In their view, corporation tax should ideally be replaced by withholding at source 
income tax on corporate income. 
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1.5.1.1 Integration of corporation tax and income tax 
 
Despite previous rejections of integration as mentioned above, the debate for doing so 
continues. Adjustments to the current UK tax structure would be required to integrate the two 
taxes. To achieve full integration, the tax treatment for retained earnings and dividends would 
need to be integrated either via the partnership method or by full taxation of capital gains. 
 
1.5.1.2 Partnership method 
 
This integration method imputes the company’s total profits to its shareholders who are then 
taxed under the income tax. When profits are retained, the company informs the shareholders 
of the amount to be added to their equity which would then be taxed as income on the 
individual and added to the base cost of their shares, reducing the ultimate capital gains tax on 
sale. Under such a scheme it would be administratively useful for the company to withhold 
tax from shareholders’ share of profit. Shareholders are thus treated for tax purposes as 
partners. 
At first glance, treating profits of companies like partnerships would appear equitable and 
efficient avoiding distortions in organisational form. 
However, this proposal does create objections of practicality and principle. From a practical 
point of view, this treatment would be relatively simple for distributed profits but there are 
difficulties for undistributed profits. Where personal income is subject to more than one rate, 
there is the difficulty in deciding which rate should apply to undistributed profits. No solution 
is satisfactory; attributing profit to shareholders and taxing at their individual income tax rates 
would be administratively very difficult, while taxing undistributed profit at a flat rate would 
only be an approximation which may be beneficial to richer shareholders. Any attempt at 
forcing companies to distribute all profits would also remove the commercial stability of 
reserves and would be likely to be strongly resisted by companies themselves. 
Objections of principle exist in the argument that undistributed profits have less value than 
distributed profits to shareholders since they cannot immediately access them and should 
hence be taxed at a lower rate. On the other hand, it can be argued that company profits 
should be taxed at a higher rate than other personal income due to the privilege of limited 
liability. This issue also raises the question of whether such a rate should depend on the level 
of the company’s profits. 
Further problems with the partnership method arise where shareholders will be taxed on 
income not yet physically received in the case of their ‘unrealised’ gain, which could lead to 
cash flow difficulties for individuals and may be inequitable. However, much or all of the tax 
should be paid by withholding, reducing the potential cash flow difficulty, or the classic 
economic solution of selling some shares (which may be very difficult for an unlisted 
company). In addition, there would be significant administrative and compliance difficulties 
for frequent traders in shares in determining an accurate allocation of profits. 
 
 5
  UK Corporation Tax 
1.5.1.3 Capital gains method 
 
The alternative method of full integration would be through taxation of all (including 
unrealised) capital gains and removal of corporation tax. Distributed profit would be taxed as 
dividend income for the shareholder and retained profit would be taxed as a capital gain. 
Again, this would be likely to be prohibitively complex to administer. 
 
1.5.1.4 Partial integration 
 
Full integration has been discussed as a model for the UK but never considered a practical 
solution, in substantial part due to the likely administrative difficulties noted above. At times 
in the USA, prevailing practice has provided a degree of partial integration by granting a 
dividend credit at the shareholder level, and as already discussed, in the current UK system. 
 
1.5.2 Absolutist view 
 
Holders of this view e.g. Murphy (2005) believe that the integrationist view of a company is 
unrealistic. In their opinion, a company is not a mere conduit for personal income but is a 
separate legal entity with an existence of its own, a powerful lobbying factor in economic and 
social decision-making and operated by a professional management subject to little control by 
the individual shareholder. As a separate entity it therefore has separate taxable capacity 
which is properly subject to an absolute tax. The concept of different tax treatment for 
retention or distribution of profits after tax therefore becomes irrelevant. The expression of 
the absolutist view is the classical system of corporation tax, as discussed above and seen in 
the UK in the past. 
In general, the absolutist view is not favoured by economists. Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) 
comment ‘this absolute or classical view of the tax is hardly tenable’ and that ‘there is no 
valid argument for an absolute corporation tax on individual ability to pay grounds’. They 
acknowledge that large companies cannot act according to the wishes of all shareholders. 
However, they consider that this does not equate to companies being able to pay for 
themselves and being subject to a separate tax as all taxes fall ultimately on individuals. 
Corporate profits are hence part of the income of shareholders and should be treated as such. 
The absolutist view also assumes that the corporation tax is not borne solely by shareholders 
and is passed on to customers, employees or other groups. The continuing argument over the 
incidence of corporation tax, discussed in further detail below, shows that this view is 
disputed. According to Musgrave and Musgrave (1989), there is therefore effectively no extra 
corporation tax: it is simply a type of sales or payroll tax without a place in an equitable tax 
system. 
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1.6 Other reasons for a corporation tax 
 
Some of the traditional arguments for keeping a corporate level tax on profits are outlined 
below, many of which were highlighted by Musgrave and Musgrave (1989): 
 
1.6.1 Benefit principle 
 
The benefit principle is an extra argument in favour of separate taxation which is that a 
company should pay a price for its legal privileges. 
This argument starts from the premise that government acts to benefit businesses – albeit not 
solely companies – so there may be some justification in calling for a separate business 
operations tax. The corporation tax therefore acts as a charge for public goods provided by 
government to the company. Certain government costs are incurred solely for the benefit of 
companies, although these are likely to be very minor. The privilege of limited liability is of 
great value to shareholders but can be argued to be of little cost to society. 
An important issue regarding a benefit tax is the level at which it would be imposed; this is 
important since public benefits tend to occur at the lower and more local form of government. 
A second issue concerns the nature of the appropriate tax base as it is unlikely to be income 
profits; for example, fire services may best be measured by property value. Total costs in the 
locality may be an appropriate base although this is likely to be hard to measure. 
A benefit tax is therefore likely to be different in form and raise less revenue than the current 
UK corporation tax. 
Arguments against the benefit principle include the fact that the company has to comply with 
extra compliance and disclosure costs and any benefit cannot easily be measured. This and 
other arguments have been adjudged to be weak by Prest and Barr (1985). Kay and King 
(1990) consider that limited liability is a voluntary agreement between company and 
shareholder and can be adjusted to change the terms of acceptance or contribution of capital. 
They note that companies are owned by individuals so there is no separate taxable capacity in 
a company. Corporation tax will thus affect owners, employees and customers of a company. 
In general, there is no clear link between a company’s tax on profits and the value of the 
goods it enjoys. Defining the value of the goods is also difficult as benefit of infrastructure 
and public investments would be hard to allocate. 
 
1.6.2 Influence over companies’ behaviour 
 
Another possible justification for a corporation tax is as a form of control over the company’s 
behaviour. 
• To restrict a company that has a monopoly – tax has not often been used for this purpose 
and might need to be based on the degree of monopoly rather than profits, which would be 
hard to measure 
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• To restrict the size of a company – in this case a progressive tax structure might be used 
although unlike income tax this would not be based on the company’s ability to pay since 
the wealth of shareholders will vary. Progression would discriminate against larger firms 
and might need to be based on assets or turnover rather than profits. Such a system was 
recommended by the US government in the 1930s but rejected. To some extent this system 
is seen currently in the existence of the small companies’ rate in the UK 
• In times of crisis such as wartime, excess profits tax has been used when direct controls 
over prices and wages are needed. This was seen in practice in the UK and USA but was 
hard to administer due to difficulties in defining ‘excess profits’ – neither a standard rate 
of return nor a base period for profits proving entirely satisfactory. The windfall tax on 
utility companies in the UK was a recent example of a selective excess profits tax in 
operation. 
• To stimulate growth, governments may seek to encourage profit retention over payment of 
dividends. This may be accomplished by exempting retained profits for tax while taxing 
dividends – as seen in the Estonian 2000 tax reforms. The reverse treatment may of course 
be undertaken – such a tax was seen in the US during the 1930s intending to stimulate 
consumer spending 
 
In theory a corporation tax on economic profit can be designed to be efficient by leaving 
economic behaviour unaffected. This would be on profit above a chosen limit to justify an 
investment. However, such a tax could still influence economic decisions such as making a 
decision to set up in a lower tax state.  
 
In conclusion, tax may be useful in influencing corporate behaviour but may need a form 
different from the current corporation tax. 
 
1.6.3 Administrative reasons 
 
As already noted, it would be administratively difficult to tax all capital income accruing to 
an individual including their share of retained profit in a company. The corporation tax 
therefore acts as a reasonable substitute for income tax even though rates may be different and 
may even be set in different countries. 
 
1.6.4 Political considerations 
 
A popular conception exists, parodying the absolutist view above, that companies should pay 
their ‘fair share’ of taxes. Economic theory suggests this is an invalid argument since 
individuals ultimately bear any tax, but it nonetheless remains an important factor for policy 
makers. 
 
1.7 Incidence of corporation tax 
 
There is no agreement on the incidence of corporate taxation, which is still open to debate as 
to whether owners, employees or customers truly bear the cost of the tax. Market 
imperfections for products, capital and labour all seem to play a role and econometric studies 
are also inconclusive (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989). A recent study of 55,082 companies in 
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nine European countries between 1996 and 2003 by Arulampalam, Devereux and Maffini 
(2007) concluded that ‘a substantial part of the corporate income tax is passed on to the 
labour force in the form of lower wages’.  
Most economists believe that the corporation tax burden falls on capital invested in 
companies. However, business managers tend to see the tax as an absolute cost to the business 
and may be driven to seek to reduce it by various means including avoidance or passing it on 
to a third party. The first view is theoretically correct in markets which act to maximise 
profits. However, companies may seek to pass the costs on to customers or employees if the 
ideal market is not present. 
In practice, theoretical analysis remains inconclusive and empirical evidence needs to be 
considered. Several attempts have been made to collect useful data, but the question remains 
as to what to look for. If corporation tax rates differed between industries, price changes as a 
result of a tax rate change could be examined and compared between sectors. This cannot be 
done since a similar effective rate of tax applies to all companies. Comparison of rates of 
return between companies and unincorporated businesses is not possible since there is not 
enough accurate data for the latter category. A final possibility is to look at companies’ 
reactions to a rate change in terms of rate of return on equity and profit margin. However, 
data is still not entirely useful as major changes in rates are rare. Results are generally 
confusing with a number of non-tax factors necessary to consider. 
Econometric approaches have attempted to isolate the effect of the corporation tax but again 
results are controversial. Tax effects have not been able to be separated from other changes 
and the effective rather than the nominal headline rate of tax is critical. 
Another sophisticated incidence argument is that corporation tax is passed to individuals but 
its effective incidence is borne by the owners of capital, so it is fair that companies should pay 
tax. This may be a useful justification for taxing non-resident shareholders. Huizinga and 
Nicodeme (2000) found that European governments would have reduced effective average 
corporation tax rates by about a quarter if companies had been fully owned by domestic 
citizens, explaining why rates have not fallen more rapidly in recent years with the sharp 
increase in capital mobility. 
 
1.8 Inherent complexity of corporation tax 
 
The immediate conclusion from the range of views above over fundamental issues regarding 
corporation tax is that it is an inherently complex tax. Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) 
consider that, given the legal complexities of corporations and their interrelationships, it is 
evident that a fair corporation tax cannot be a simple tax. 
On the subject of corporation tax, Sandford (1989) et al comment that ‘above all, perhaps the 
situation is confused because economists have failed to provide clear guidelines and answers 
for the politicians on the various questions raised’. Head (1997) notes ‘company taxation has 
long been among the most controversial and inconclusive areas in the public finance 
literature’.  
These conclusions will be investigated as this thesis develops, examining further the 
complexity of the UK’s corporation tax legislation and the compliance costs incurred by 
businesses in complying with its requirements. 
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2. UK tax legislation and its complexity 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Corporation tax merely covers one part of the UK’s entire tax legislation. This chapter 
introduces the legislation and its process of creation. The focus of this thesis recognises that 
the UK’s tax legislation contains complexity: this is discussed further looking in depth at the 
main causes and effects of legislative complexity, the difficulty on measuring it and a brief 
introduction to potential simplification strategies. 
Although the chapter considers the UK tax legislation in its entirety, all of its points apply to 
corporation tax, unless specifically stated. 
 
2.2 Introduction to the legislation 
 
The UK’s tax legislation primarily consists of a number of Parliamentary Acts and delegated 
legislation in the form of Statutory Instruments. Finance Acts are passed at least once a year, 
introducing new legislation and updating or repealing old law. Other Acts are passed as the 
need arises. Statutory Instruments are introduced throughout the year to enable continual 
updating of the tax legislation.  
Laws relevant to all taxes are often grouped together in book format for use by tax 
professionals, one of the classic reference works being Tolley’s Tax ‘Yellow and Orange’ 
handbooks. Aside from the primary and secondary legislation, the handbooks also contain a 
large amount of material produced by HMRC to provide their interpretation of the law. In 
addition, there are judgements from tax cases which are usually not included in the handbooks 
but with which a tax practitioner would be expected to be familiar. Some of these decisions 
will ultimately be incorporated into the legislation. 
Lord Wedderburn (1965) in his book ‘The Worker and the Law’ commented concerning UK 
law ‘most people want nothing more from the law than that it should leave them alone’. 
However, this is hardly possible with tax law, which is one of the few branches of law to 
touch the lives of almost everyone. 
 
2.3 The making of tax legislation 
 
The making of tax law follows an established procedure and usually starts from an initiative 
from one of the Government’s executive branches such as HMRC or HM Treasury. There is 
no statutory requirement for consultation before a Bill is drawn up, although informal 
discussions with interested parties often occur.  
Parliament has no formal role in generating or consulting on proposals until the publication of 
the Finance Bill, when it is considered by Members of Parliament (MPs) on the Finance Bill 
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Committee. Given the technical nature of the Bill, MPs often rely on interpretation provided 
by external bodies. The Committee only sits for about six weeks due to the time constraints in 
passing the legislation through Parliament. Backbench MPs are often encouraged not to delay 
the process and the House of Lords has no scrutiny role of the Finance Bills. 
 
2.4 Complexity of the UK’s tax legislation  
 
2.4.1 Introduction 
 
The consensus among commentators appears to be that the UK’s tax legislation is 
complicated. Martin (2005b) is typical when he states that the UK tax legislation is ‘lengthy 
and intricate but is usually drafted in a dense style that makes it inaccessible to the layman’. 
In a similar vein, Vann (1995) describes lengthy Australian tax legislation as ‘tax rule 
madness’. 
 
2.4.2 History of tax complexity  
 
The complaint that the UK’s tax legislation is too complex is not a new one. In 1853 MPs 
urged William Gladstone, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, to see that income tax legislation 
was made intelligible even to those without a legal education. He replied: 
‘To bring the construction of these laws within the reach of [everyone is] no doubt extremely 
desirable, but far from being easy…the nature of property…and its very complicated forms 
[render] it almost impossible to deal with it for the purpose of the income tax in a very simple 
manner.’ 
By 1981, the Presiding Special Commissioner referred to Gladstone when he said ‘the plea 
today is that it would be some advance if laws of this kind were intelligible to those who have 
received a legal education’. 
Very similar comments have also been made in the USA. The 1927 Report of the Joint 
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation stated ‘it must be recognised that while a degree of 
simplification is possible, a simple income tax for businesses is not’. 
Both quotations recognise that tax itself is an inherently complex subject, so it should come as 
little surprise that tax legislation is also complex. 
 
2.4.3 Reasons for complexity 
 
There are a number of fundamental reasons why the UK’s tax legislation is complex. 
Complexity can arise simply from increasing length as the more pages in the tax legislation, 
the less likely it is that an individual can be familiar and feel comfortable with all of its 
provisions. On first principles, tax law increases in length due to new tax law enactments each 
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year exceeding the amount of material repealed, and the data quoted below shows that the 
UK’s tax legislation increases in length each year. Martin (2005a) notes that this is in part due 
to Government introducing political policy measures with little pressure or incentive to 
reform ineffective legislation or to try to simplify the legislation. In his opinion, these have 
been introduced piecemeal over a long period with little regard to principles which could have 
created a simple, coherent system. 
Complexity can also arise from the language used in the legislation which may be difficult to 
understand or stylistically poorly drafted. The Tax Law Rewrite project, discussed in detail 
below, set out to simplify the language of the legislation, but its effectiveness is being called 
into question. 
Martin (2005b) also notes the unique nature of tax law compared to other law in that its 
primary purpose is not to help taxpayers; as a result, criticism that it can harm business 
through its complexity can be deflected.  
 
2.4.4 Other relevant factors  
 
A number of other factors have been identified as leading to complexity in tax legislation; 
some of these were identified by Martin (2005a) from a UK perspective and Gale (2001) from 
the USA. 
 
2.4.4.1 Conflict between policy goals 
 
Gale (2001) states that most people agree that taxes should be simple, fair, conducive to 
economic prosperity and enforceable, but cannot agree on the relative importance of each 
goal. When governments implement policy, it will therefore represent a balance between the 
goals and legislative complexity is a consequence of trying to achieve this.  
It is generally thought that more equitable or fairer taxes usually conflict with tax 
simplification, although the relationship may be more subtle – Milliron (2001) and Carnes 
and Cuccia (1996). Tax burdens are often tailored via legislation to the circumstances of 
individuals, improving equity but increasing overall complexity of the tax system by 
increasing the length and complexity of the legislation. In addition, tax rates that vary with 
individual characteristics create opportunities for tax planning and avoidance, which may in 
turn require the passing of anti-avoidance legislation. 
 
2.4.4.2 Fiscal incentives 
 
Successive UK governments have shown a desire to promote or discourage certain types of 
behaviour among taxpayers by providing tax or fiscal incentives. However, these targeted 
subsidies often increase complexity by creating more distinctions between taxpayers and 
sources or uses of income. 
Academic literature has widely analysed this area and generally concluded that acting in a 
particular way for tax reasons impairs economic efficiency, distorting the market and giving 
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rise to costs known as the ‘excess burden of taxation’ which arises from actions that would 
not otherwise have been performed (James and Nobes, 1999). 
In general, taxes with a wide base are less distorting and more efficient than those with a 
narrow base. In some situations the market is inefficient, an example being a polluter 
maximising profits while imposing remediation costs on the community. Governments often 
use tax as a policy instrument to discourage such behaviour, or to encourage actions thought 
to benefit the community such as enhanced tax relief for research and development 
expenditure.  
Martin (2005b) considers incentives based on this premise to be likely to produce 
unsatisfactory results, along with situations where the basis for providing incentives is unclear 
in itself, giving examples of incentives introduced in the UK and subsequently withdrawn 
such as profit-related pay and the business expansion scheme, both victims of unwanted tax 
avoidance schemes. Expanding on his observations, it is evident that in order to prevent such 
abuse, special reliefs become so full of conditions or require such extensive redrafting that 
they greatly add to complexity of tax legislation. 
 
2.4.4.3 Prevention of tax avoidance 
 
Tax avoidance is the arrangement of one’s affairs to pay the minimum amount of tax, as spelt 
out by Lord Tomlin in the case of Duke of Westminster v CIR ‘Every man is entitled if he can 
to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise 
would be … however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow tax 
payers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax’. It is within 
the letter, if not always the spirit, of the law, unlike tax evasion. 
As the UK’s tax legislation has grown more complex, tax advisers have increasingly 
exploited loopholes to create complex avoidance schemes. Loopholes are often created by the 
specific statutory language and HMRC are highly likely to challenge any such scheme in the 
courts; where the taxpayer is successful, government will act to reduce revenue loss in areas 
where significant avoidance occurs by enacting new legislation. Taxpayers and their advisers 
will then seek new opportunities for avoidance. This creates a cycle of increased complexity 
in both tax laws and avoidance strategies. 
Some commentators hold the view that tax advisers are responsible for the generation of such 
legislation by the avoidance schemes they devise and promote to business. Others consider 
the role of legislators who have added successive layers of anti-avoidance legislation by 
‘tinkering’ with the system to be more significant. One example which highlights such 
behaviour was identified by PwC and the World Bank (2006) of a single transaction of 
borrowing in the UK which may require up to six sections of anti-avoidance legislation or 
case law to be considered before treatment for tax purposes may be ascertained, namely: 
 
• s209 ICTA 1988 – whether interest is dependent on the results of the business and hence a 
distribution 
• p13 Sch9A FA1996 – loans for unallowable purposes 
• Sch28AA ICTA 1988 – thin capitalisation and transfer pricing 
• s24-31 & Sch3 FA(no.2) 2005 – anti-arbitrage provisions 
• s349 ICTA 1988 and SI 1970/488 – treaty clearance from UK 20% withholding tax 
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• relevant case law e.g. WT Ramsay, Furniss v Dawson 
 
 
Possibly the most common form of avoidance is the manipulation of tax affairs to take 
advantage of other provisions of tax law. The more tax law in existence, the more such 
opportunities exist, and new tax law presents new opportunities to move profits to a lower 
rate of tax. This may involve artificial steps, or even lead to tax evasion. Anti-avoidance 
legislation is required to prevent such schemes from succeeding, but is usually particularly 
complex and obscure as a result of the complex nature of its target. 
In the past, legislation to block such schemes was passed on an individual scheme basis. More 
recently, HMRC has tried to move towards ‘principle-based’ anti-avoidance legislation such 
as the recent ‘disguised interest’ legislation drafted in 2008. It is designed to repeal piecemeal 
legislation by identifying the avoidance principle at stake, removing length and complexity 
from the legislation. However, such legislation is proving very difficult to draft satisfactorily, 
throwing into question whether the predicted simplifying benefits will ever materialise. 
As an indication of the importance of anti-avoidance legislation in adding to the complexity 
of the UK tax legislation, a piece of research carried out on behalf of the Tax Justice Network 
(2007) looked at the purpose of all 1503 pages of the Finance Acts from 2004 to 2006. While 
the purpose of legislation is often open to debate, the report nonetheless shows the importance 
of anti-avoidance provisions in adding length to the legislation. It found that 48 pages dealt 
with routine issues such as tax rates, 841 were government-driven initiatives and 614 (41%) 
were anti-avoidance measures. 
 
2.4.4.4 Tax Law Rewrite project 
 
The Tax Law Rewrite project is a UK-specific project initiated in 1996 to rewrite tax law in 
plain, modern English but without changing the underlying law. However, the implication 
that the project is meant to reduce the overall complexity of the tax legislation is probably 
misplaced. Simplification was not a remit of the project as the rewritten Acts had to be fast-
tracked through Parliament.  
PwC and the World Bank (2006) claim that the project is responsible for a 50% increase in 
length of the rewritten provisions and note that, at the date of the report, less than half of UK 
tax law had been rewritten. Other criticisms of the usefulness of the project have included the 
fact that the general public are unlikely to want to read tax law regardless of the language’s 
clarity, and that many tax professionals were content with the old terminology which had 
been defined by the courts.  
In 1995, Avery Jones (subsequent chairman of the IFS Tax Law Review Committee) 
commented concerning the new Tax Law Rewrite project ‘My real objection to rewriting is 
that I do not find much of a connection between the causes [of complexity] and the proposed 
solution. The solution seems to me to be an implied acceptance that nothing can be done to 
remove the real causes of complexity which are deeply rooted in our whole legal culture’. 
This observation was largely borne out in that, as Gammie (2007) states, ‘...expressing 
concepts in plain English does nothing to simplify the concepts themselves…complexity of 
language has been replaced by the complexity of legislative volume as more words (albeit 
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simpler ones) have been required to retain precision’. The worth of the project remains a 
subject for keen debate. 
 
2.5 Effects of tax complexity and responses 
 
2.5.1 Increase in length of the UK legislation 
 
Tax legislation in both the UK and the USA continues to increase in length and hence 
complexity. By 2008, Tolley’s Yellow Tax Handbook, containing the UK primary and 
secondary direct tax legislation, could only be fitted on to 10,134 pages by using a smaller 
format text than the previous year, up from 5,952 pages as recently as 2001.  
Truman’s (2008) case study into the effect of Finance Act 2008 on the length of the UK tax 
legislation revealed the following: 
 
• Abolition of taper relief removed between 8,000 and 9,000 words but these remain in 
Tolley’s Yellow Tax Handbook to enable taxpayers to calculate their liability in future 
years, giving the illusion of failure to simplify 
• The introduction of entrepreneurs’ relief to appease the outcry from taxpayers and advisers 
over the abolition of taper relief will add back about half of the words removed above 
• The changes in residence and domicile laws will add about 5,000 words to the legislation 
• Income-shifting provisions of 700 words provide a good example of the worst kind of 
‘legislation by guidance’ – the legislation is vague and wide-reaching and required over 
9,000 words of interpretative guidance 
• The major causes of extra legislation often concerns a very small number of taxpayers 
such as anti-avoidance legislation for insurance companies 
 
Truman (2008) describes the efforts to reduce legislative complexity as ‘a rout’ and repeats 
his suggestion from the 2007 Hardman Lecture that government needs to set a target of 
legislative reduction within a certain number of years for any realistic hope of simplification 
occurring. He acknowledges that his suggestions of a 25% reduction in length within 5 years 
currently show little sign of being achieved. 
 
2.5.2 Taxpayer desire for simplification 
 
PwC and the World Bank (2006) highlight the unfavourable consequences of large volumes 
of legislation making it impossible for tax advisers in industry or practice to read or 
understand all relevant legislation and having to rely on more specialists, including those at 
HMRC. Their report notes that, as a result, large to medium companies may have to make a 
decision whether obtaining tax advice is of benefit using a cost/benefit analysis. 
The report concludes that increasing complexity probably leads to lower international 
competitiveness, and voluminous legislation reaches a point where the level of compliance 
drops through ignorance rather than evasion. As a result, business leaders and their 
representatives often make public their concerns over the complexity of tax legislation and the 
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negative effect this has on running their business, chiefly the time and cost of compliance, 
both of which increase with increasing complexity e.g. National Audit Office (NAO, 2007a). 
One such study was the Tenon Forum Think Tank’s 2005 report which interviewed directors 
of small and medium sized businesses in the UK. 77% claimed the UK tax system was too 
complicated and 73% wanted a flat rate tax scheme. The Think Tank was divided on whether 
this was a plea for simplification as some members felt that lack of understanding of a flat tax 
meant it was incorrectly being positioned as a solution to complexity. They also raised the 
issue that a simple tax system could easily become complicated very quickly and this size of 
company often benefit from targeted exemptions, a classic source of legislative complexity. 
However, the conclusion of the study was apparently clear in that UK businesses want 
simplification of the tax system and legislation, although, a result shared with other studies. 
 
2.5.3 Government’s inability to reduce complexity 
 
While successive UK governments have often expressed their desire to reduce complexity of 
the tax legislation, the trend is inexorably towards greater length and complexity. 
Gale (2001) points out that the simplest tax system would be a consumption tax at a flat rate 
with universal deductions, exemptions and credits and withheld at source. However, the UK 
system bears no resemblance to this model as a progressive income tax with targeted 
exemptions and withholding for a small number of income types.  
Simplification of the UK tax system remains a prominent topic and leading figures still 
pronounce on the subject. The incoming 2008 President of the Chartered Institute of Taxation 
(CIOT) highlighted it as one of the themes of his presidential year, and the government 
reaffirmed its ‘commitment to tax simplification’ at various times including the 2007 Pre-
Budget Report. The new Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his first speech in July 2007, stated 
‘we must continue to simplify the tax system wherever we can’. Continuation of a process, 
however, implies that it has already started, and there is little evidence of simplification 
occurring before or after his speech.  
Indeed, government pronouncements on the issue have a long history. Even after the first 
Income Tax Act of 1799, the 152 pages of the Act were proving sufficiently complex for the 
government to publish a guide entitled ‘A Plain Short and Easy Description of the Different 
Clauses of the Income Tax so as to render it Familiar to the Meanest Capacity’.  
 
2.6 Difficulties in comparing and measuring complexity 
 
Apart from the difficulty of defining the concept of the UK’s legislative complexity, it is not a 
simple matter to attempt to measure it given the lack of obvious comparisons.  
A study performed by PwC and the World Bank (Paying Taxes – The Global Picture 2006) 
compared the GDP of a number of countries with their tax administration burden, as 
measured by the number of pages of primary federal tax legislation, which provides a 
measure of legislative complexity. The results are shown below: 
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Country GDP ranking GDP $m Number of pages 
(ranking) 
USA 1 11,711,834 5,100(5) 
Japan 2 4,622,771 7,200(4) 
Germany 3 2,740,551 1,700(10) 
UK 4 2,124,385 8,300(2) 
France 5 2,046,646 1,300(13) 
China & Hong Kong 6 1,931,710 2,000(9) 
Italy 7 1,677,834 3,500(7) 
Spain 8 1,039,927 530(17) 
Canada 9 977,968 2,440(8) 
India 10 691,163 9,000(1) 
Korea 11 679,674 4,760(6) 
Mexico 12 676,497 1,600(12) 
Australia 13 637,327 7,750(3) 
Brazil 14 603,973 500(18) 
Russia 15 581,447 700(=15) 
Netherlands 16 578,979 1,640(11) 
Switzerland 17 357,542 300(20) 
Belgium 18 352,312 830(14) 
Sweden 19 346,412 700(=15) 
Turkey 20 302,786 350(19) 
 
Comparison of GDP with number of pages of primary federal tax legislation (PwC/World Bank 2006, 
p16) 
 
The report acknowledges that certain countries levy taxes at state and local levels; in these 
cases the number of pages data above is likely to be severely understated. 
The authors make two key conclusions: the volume of a country’s primary federal tax 
legislation is not directly proportional to its economic size and the volume of legislation is 
increasing. It is generally accepted that the UK’s tax legislation is now the longest in the 
world, having overtaken India since the report was published, so on a first viewing it might 
seem that the UK has a disproportionately complex and lengthy tax legislation. It is also 
interesting that the top three places in terms of size of legislation are all Commonwealth 
countries, from which it might again be concluded that the UK legislative system, on which 
other Commonwealth systems are based, is inherently complex. 
However, in a later study the authors claimed that this work was only intended to stimulate 
debate and not to represent an accurate comparison of complexity. Factors such as print size 
were not taken into account, which, taken with the possible understatement mentioned above, 
casts considerable doubt on the usefulness of the above data as a comparison study. It is 
somewhat surprising that the results of this study were not linked to those of another by the 
same authors comparing compliance times for a range of countries to see if any connection 
with the length of legislation existed. This is performed in a later chapter. 
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2.7 Tax law simplification strategies 
 
Strategies other than ‘flat tax’ are regularly put forward to attempt to reverse the growth of 
the tax legislation’s complexity. However, only simplifying the language of tax law will not 
address the underlying complexity, as noted above with the Tax Law Rewrite project, which 
arise from different demands made of the tax system and the constraints under which it 
operates. 
The 1994 Tax Law Review Committee’s final report listed three types of complexity – 
linguistic, policy and compliance – which would all need addressing by comprehensive 
reform. It also stated ‘without policy changes the benefits from rewriting tax legislation are 
limited’. Similar sentiments were expressed by the Tax Law Improvement Project in 
Australia. 
Martin (2005a) considers that three quarters or more of tax law could be removed with a 
commitment to simplification.  The principles behind this strategy would include: 
 
• Refocusing on the primary objective of direct tax to identify and tax profit, using 
accounting profit as the starting point for calculating taxable profit. Any departures from 
accounting profits should only made with reference to clear principles; all profits would be 
taxed in the same way and the schedular system abolished 
• The approach should be purposive with detailed rules replaced with statements of 
underlying principles, and backed up by wider use of rulings from HMRC both before and 
after the transaction 
• Reviewing to ensure all parts fit coherently, including combining and aligning tax rules 
currently used in different situations 
 
Martin (2005a) considers that simplification is possible given political will, although he 
acknowledges that not everyone is so optimistic, pointing to failed simplification programmes 
in Australia and New Zealand. Efforts to this end should be appreciated as long as the sense 
of direction was clear, although both taxpayer and government could lose out under 
individual simplification proposals. He notes that a number of sections of tax law would have 
to remain such as group relief, to prevent companies having to distort their group structures to 
offset any loss as it arises, and rollover relief to prevent a disincentive to replace business 
assets. 
In addition, simpler taxes would be unlikely to remove the desire of taxpayers to undertake 
tax avoidance. They would probably require simpler anti-avoidance laws, but these would 
still be required in areas such as diverting profits overseas to lower tax jurisdictions and 
disguising interest as a tax free dividend from a UK company.  
Martin (2005b) notes that his proposals for simplification can be achieved without altering tax 
rates. He states ‘the question of whether simplifying tax and reducing tax rates are connected, 
or whether they are independent objectives, needs to be properly analysed’, noting that 
simplification has its limits and review of existing law is more likely to establish them rather 
than discarding all current law and starting again. 
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2.8 Conclusion 
 
The concept of ‘complexity’ is not easy to define, measure or compare. Although there exist 
many opinions about the complexity of the UK’s tax legislation, almost all to the effect that it 
is excessively complex, actual evidence is in much shorter supply. 
A number of factors can be identified which contribute to the complexity of the UK tax 
legislation. It is also clear that it is continually increasing in length (and hence presumably 
complexity), and appears to be longer than that of most other countries. Beyond this, 
however, great care must be taken before concluding on the issue of whether it is excessively 
complex. 
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3. The UK’s corporation tax compliance costs 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
While there are large number of costs involved in complying with the UK tax system, they are 
generally grouped into two categories: compliance (incurred by taxpayers) and administration 
(incurred by tax authorities). 
The costs necessary to comply with the requirements of the UK tax system were studied in 
some depth over a number of years by Sandford and co-workers at the Centre for Fiscal 
Studies, University of Bath. To reflect the central question behind this thesis, this chapter 
focuses solely on compliance costs incurred by taxpayers, considering their fundamental 
nature and measurement, paying particular attention to those relating to corporation tax. The 
definition and measurement of such costs are considered, including a brief analysis of a recent 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report on the subject. 
 
3.2 Definition of compliance costs 
 
Compliance costs were described by Sandford et al (1989) as ‘costs incurred by taxpayers or 
third parties, notably businesses, in meeting the requirements laid on them by a given tax 
structure (excluding the payment of the tax itself) and any distortion costs arising from it’. 
Such costs are also known as ‘private sector costs’. 
An alternative definition from the OECD Forum on Tax Administration: Taxpayer Services 
Sub-Group (2008) is ‘total costs incurred in complying with tax regulations’. There is some 
contention in academic circles as to what actual ‘costs’ are comprised in this definition such 
as whether it should include discretionary planning costs and as to what allowance should be 
made for the ‘time value of money’ in respect of, for example, employees’ taxes withheld at 
source and therefore available to business for their use before having to be remitted to 
revenue bodies. 
 
3.3 Background to compliance costs 
 
Sandford et al (1989) identified a number of costs which the imposition of a tax generates for 
the private sector: 
• Sacrifice of purchasing power that tax payment entails 
• Welfare costs arising from distortions the tax generates (often called the ‘excess burden’ of 
taxation) 
• Costs incurred meeting the legal requirements of the tax system, for example completing 
returns and keeping the necessary accounts 
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The boundary between compliance costs and distortion costs is often not clearly defined. 
Distortion costs are both a function of the existence of a tax and the manner in which it is 
imposed e.g. on raw material or finished product, which may lead to taxpayers changing their 
economic behaviour to minimise the tax paid. 
 
While the third type of cost in the above list is that traditionally associated with the term 
‘compliance cost’, it can be seen that the scope of costs incurred by business is much wider. 
 
3.4 Nature of compliance costs 
 
Sandford et al (1989) note that the term ‘compliance costs’ itself is somewhat ambiguous as it 
could refer to costs of the authorities securing compliance or costs incurred by the taxpayer. 
The practice of the literature is to confine the term to the latter, with the former designated as 
‘enforcement costs’. 
 
Compliance costs for a company have a wide scope. They include the costs of collecting, 
remitting and accounting for tax on its profits and wages and salaries of employees, as well as 
the costs of gaining the knowledge to meet legal requirements and avoid penalties. Costs of 
maintaining records for the time specified by HMRC should also be considered. Other costs 
include those of keeping up to date with changing legislation and seeking opinions on 
transactions where the tax treatment is not obvious. Finally, costs of representative bodies 
incurred in activities such as lobbying for tax change and undertaking legal defence against 
HMRC challenges should be included. 
Other examples of compliance costs include psychic costs and social costs and benefits. 
Psychic costs are difficult, if not impossible to quantify, but are an important part of 
compliance costs. For a company, an example of a psychic cost might be frustration, anxiety 
or stress amongst staff in dealing with an insensitive HMRC enquiry. The operation of a tax 
may generate social costs or benefits; for example, data required to comply with one tax may 
make it simpler for the authorities to check possible evasion of another. 
A summary of compliance costs for taxpayers by Sandford et al (1989) is shown in the 
diagram below: 
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(Sandford et al, 1989, p11) 
 
In a similar vein, Gale (2001) notes from an American perspective that compliance costs 
include those incurred during the following activities: 
 
• Time spent preparing and filing tax returns 
• Learning about the law 
• Maintaining record-keeping for tax purposes 
• Time and money spent in avoiding or evading taxes 
• Responding to tax audits 
• Costs imposed on third parties e.g. employers 
 
Gale (2001) also notes the following administrative costs, incurred by government but 
considered by him to be ultimately borne by individuals and include: 
 
• Budget of the tax collection agency 
• Tax-related budgets of other agencies that help to administer tax programs e.g. social 
security 
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3.5 Other aspects of compliance costs 
 
3.5.1 Costs of tax planning 
 
Sandford et al (1989) note that compliance cost literature following Johnston (1961) 
distinguishes between unavoidable (mandatory) and avoidable (voluntary or discretionary) 
costs. Unavoidable costs are incurred meeting legal requirements while avoidable costs relate 
to tax reduction by planning. Tax planning costs are considered by some not to be a true 
compliance cost as they are voluntary (OECD, 2008), but this is countered by the argument 
that they would not exist without the existence of the tax. 
Further distinctions can be drawn such as that between artificial planning and planning 
involving genuine transactions. The claiming of relief foreseen by the legislation may not fit 
the definition of an avoidable cost. However, further distinctions of this nature between costs 
may be of little practical value. 
 
3.5.2 Offsets to compliance costs 
 
Sandford et al (1989) point out that certain benefits in complying with tax systems may arise 
such as maintaining proper records giving the business access to better quality financial 
information. The measurement of net compliance costs takes into account these offsetting 
benefits. 
An analysis of private sector costs and associated benefits by Sandford et al (1989), 
summarising some of the above, is shown below: 
 
 
 23
  The UK’s corporation tax compliance costs 
 
(Sandford et al, 1989, p15) 
 
 
3.6 OECD administrative costs report 
 
The OECD Forum on Tax Administration: Taxpayer Services Sub-Group (2008) prepared a 
paper on programs to reduce administrative burdens of tax regulations in countries including 
the UK.  
 
The Standard Cost Model, which is the model used in the report to quantify the administrative 
burden of tax regulations, states ‘Proper compliance with the laws, including tax laws, 
requires businesses to undertake a range of administrative activities, generally using their own 
internal resources but increasingly with the assistance of external parties (e.g. in a tax context, 
these include tax advisors and payroll agencies). The categories of administrative activities 
that typically arise with any legislation, including tax laws, have been defined for the 
purposes of modelling thus: 
 
1. Familiarisation with the information obligation – the resource consumption of 
businesses in connection with familiarising themselves with the rules for a given 
information obligation 
2. Information retrieval – retrieving the relevant figures and information needed to 
comply with a given information obligation 
3. Assessment – assessing which figures and information are necessary for the 
authorities to accept a report 
4. Calculation – performing the relevant calculations needed for the public authorities to 
accept the report 
5. Presentation of figures – presenting the calculated figures in tables or the like 
6. Checking – checking the calculated figures e.g. by reconciliation with other data 
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7. Correction – if the business’s own checks reveal errors in the calculations, corrections 
are made afterwards 
8. Description – preparation of description e.g. the directors’ report 
9. Settlement/payment – payments of tax, charges or the like 
10. Internal meetings – meetings held internally between the various personnel groups 
involved in complying with the information obligation 
11. External meetings – meetings held in cases where compliance with the information 
obligation requires meetings with an auditor, lawyer or the like 
12. Inspection by public authorities – businesses must assist external inspectors when 
they carry out their inspection at the business 
13. Correction resulting from inspection by public authorities – if the external inspection 
identifies faults/defects, corrections are made afterwards 
14. Training, updating on statutory requirements – relevant employees must be kept up to 
date with rules that change frequently (at least once a year) 
15. Copying, distribution, filing etc – in some cases the report is copied, distributed 
and/or filed in order to comply with the information obligation. It may also be 
necessary to store the information obligation with a view to subsequent production in 
connection with an inspection 
16. Reporting/submitting information – in cases where compliance with an information 
obligation requires the submission of information on the business, the information 
must be sent to the relevant authority 
 
The OECD’s points may be seen to break down further the compliance costs identified by 
Sandford (1989) and Gale (2001) above.  
 
According to the OECD (2008), the administrative burden on a business (essentially the same 
as compliance costs) resulting specifically from tax regulations is influenced by a number of 
factors: 
 
1. The number of taxes it has to deal with 
2. The administrative design of those taxes 
3. The nature and size of its operations (including the size of its workforce) 
4. The range of administrative activities it must undertake from the list above 
5. The degree of support received from the revenue body 
 
3.6.1 OECD findings relating to UK tax regulations 
 
The OECD report quotes 2005/6 statistics that show that the administrative burden on 
business resulting from tax regulations as a proportion of the overall burden is 25% for the 
UK. This is comparable the other countries studied in the report: 30% for the Czech Republic, 
25% for Denmark, 27% for the Netherlands and 28% for South Africa. It also claims that 
although comparable information is hard to construct, the administrative burden on taxpayers 
exceeds the administrative costs of HMRC, a finding which complements that of 
commentators from the USA such as Gale and Holtzblatt (2000). 
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The report also quotes the UK National Audit Office (NAO) report (2007) giving the total 
administrative burden on business imposed by government regulations as about £20 billion. 
Tax related costs from 2005/6 total £5.1 billion of which corporation tax comprises £608 
million or about 12%. In 2004 the administrative costs incurred by HMRC’s predecessor 
agencies was £3.14 billion, significantly less than those incurred by business. 
The statistics for the OECD’s report on the UK came from the HMRC Measurement Project 
(2006). This found that 41% of the taxpayers’ costs represent internal costs (costs of activities 
that business undertakes to be compliant), 49% represents external costs (costs of working 
with intermediaries) and 9% represents acquisition costs (non-time costs incurred by 
business). 
An interesting initial finding from the OECD report is that significant reduction in the total 
administrative burden in the UK will require radical change in the tax system as 85% of the 
tax burden is created by only 85 information burdens (out of over 2,600 identified), which 
means that a number of simplifying reforms could result in only a small reduction in 
compliance costs 
Another NAO report (2007b) surveyed 2,000 UK businesses as to what aspects of complying 
with regulations businesses find burdensome, and their priority areas for attention in tax: 
 
Rank Aspects of complying with 
regulations that businesses find 
burdensome 
Burden reduction measures in order of 
importance to business – tax law 
1 Having to keep up to date with 
changes in existing regulations 
Simplification of complex rules 
2 The length of time it takes to go 
through the whole process of 
complying 
Improved access to information setting 
out in clear and simple language which 
regulations apply to a business 
3 Finding information about which 
regulations apply to your business 
Ensuring businesses do not have to 
provide duplicate information to 
Government 
4 Completing paperwork, including 
filling out forms and keeping records 
Provision of guidance that sets out in 
clear and simple language what a 
business has to do to comply with a 
regulation 
5 Having to provide the same 
information more than once to the 
Government 
Consultation with business before any 
change to regulation takes place or new 
regulation is made 
6 Finding guidance and advice 
explaining what you have to do to 
comply with a given regulation 
Higher levels of stability and less 
frequent changes to regulations 
7 Preparing and reporting facts and 
figures to Government 
Improving regulators and inspectors 
understanding of business 
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8 Being ready for and complying with 
inspections 
Provision of background information that 
explains what the purpose is of a given 
regulation 
9  Improvement to and more use of on-line 
tools such as electronic forms and 
information 
Burdensome Aspects of Complying with Regulations  (NAO, 2007b, p23-25) 
 
Simplification of complex tax law is the top priority for business showing the apparently 
serious nature of the issue, a result seen in other surveys e.g. Tenon (2005). However, as later 
discussed, following the observations of the recent UK CGT reforms,  the true importance of 
the issue is subject to debate. 
 
3.7 Measurement of compliance costs 
 
3.7.1 Difficulties in measurement 
 
Sandford et al (1989) note that the measurement of compliance costs involves identifying 
opportunity costs to calculate monetary values; that is, the value of the next best use of 
resources expended specifically because of the existence of the tax, or how much could be 
saved if the tax were abolished. These are not easy quantities to measure. 
Difficulties for companies in obtaining these amounts would include factors such as the legal 
requirement for companies to prepare and file annual accounts which would provide data 
anyway for the tax computation. The marginal cost of a tax department complying with one 
extra tax may be very small, but clearly the department would not be there if there were no 
taxes. 
Overhead allocation is also an issue as smaller company taxation work is often undertaken by 
accounting staff who would still be required even if there were no taxes. The larger the 
company, the greater the percentage of overheads allocable to tax compliance work especially 
if a separate tax department exists. Time costs are difficult to analyse where no separate tax 
department exists. 
 
3.7.2 Costs of change and regular costs 
 
Commencement costs occur with introduction of a tax or a major change in existing 
legislation and include costs such as setting up a new computer system or training tax staff. 
This might be recorded more accurately as spread over a period of time rather than solely at 
the time of change. 
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Temporary costs are incurred by both the taxpayer and HMRC when tax staff are receiving 
training to update their tax knowledge. 
Regular costs are the continuing costs of a company meeting with tax compliance 
requirements. Temporary costs relating to tax change may be present at all times if frequent 
changes are made to the tax system. 
These three categories are represented diagrammatically below by Sandford et al (1989) 
following the introduction of a new tax: 
 
 
(Sandford et al, 1989, p17) 
 
 
Any analysis or measurement of compliance costs must consider which part of the cycle is 
under investigation; immediately after a change costs may be high, but then fall over time. 
However, allocation of costs to the right category is not necessarily easy; for example, legal 
fees relating to a tax dispute may be one-off or regular if legislation is unclear.  
 
3.7.3 Other aspects of measurement 
 
3.7.3.1 Costs as a percentage of revenue or liability 
 
In the quantification of compliance costs, Sandford et al (1989) note that percentage measures 
are widespread and may be useful in showing a relationship between input and output, but 
need careful interpretation especially if an attempt is made to compare efficiency of different 
tax administrations. Changes in tax rates, national incomes or the tax structure may change 
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ratios without affecting absolute compliance costs e.g. on first principles, doubling the tax 
rate would halve the cost to revenue ratio.  
 
3.7.3.2 Relationship of public and private costs 
 
Sandford et al (1989) define total tax operating cost as the combination of public and private 
costs and there are number of links between the two. This equates to the ‘total resource cost’ 
of Slemrod (1996) noted elsewhere. Tax simplification may reduce both types of cost, or only 
one if the responsibility for complying with a tax lies with one of the sectors. Both areas 
therefore need considering by tax policy makers making decisions. 
 
3.7.3.3 Time valuation of labour and cash 
 
Sandford et al (1989) highlight two areas given limited consideration to date: the value of 
time spent on compliance and the timing of tax payments. 
The largest part of compliance costs is the cost of labour incurred to perform the work, which 
may be further analysed into four categories of cost: 
• Professional advisers’ time – represented by the fee charged to the client 
• Employees’ time – the general consensus is that this is measured by the employees’ wage 
rate 
• Time of self-employed – in principle this is measured as the opportunity cost to the 
business. This could be measured by using an average rate of remuneration or charge-out 
rate (which may include a profit element). However, valuation of time is likely to be 
unique to the individual and not easy to compare 
• Leisure time – valuation of time which, but for tax compliance, would have been leisure; 
this is hard to value and many economic studies have been performed. Sandford 
summarises the two key points arising: time value is a function of how it is constrained to 
be spent, and people are not uniform in their attitudes and their valuations are hence 
different 
 
Time lags in payments of tax to HMRC may offset compliance costs for taxpayers.  For 
corporation tax, this lag is from the date profit is earned until the date of payment, which can 
be up to nine months after the end of the accounting period, representing a substantial cash 
flow benefit. 
 
3.8 Conclusions 
 
Despite the difficulties in defining and measuring compliance costs, some useful conclusions 
can still be drawn. 
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The study of compliance costs has a strong academic tradition and their theoretical basis has 
been documented thoroughly. Equivalent studies undertaken in the USA and Europe provide 
useful comparisons with the UK. 
Results from such studies provide a range of conclusions about the UK’s compliance costs. 
Key findings include Sandford et al’s (1989) studies revealing that costs fell 
disproportionately on small firms and the OECD (2008) report’s findings (backed by US 
studies) that the compliance cost burden on UK businesses exceeds the administrative costs of 
HMRC. 
The NAO (2007b) finding that corporation tax is only about 12% of the total tax 
administrative burden for UK companies, a relatively small proportion, although the overall 
tax burden for companies is a significant proportion of their total administrative burden, is 
also significant. 
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4. Complexity of a tax system and effect on compliance costs 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
UK businesses incur compliance costs in dealing with the country’s overall tax system. The 
complexity of the UK’s tax legislation was introduced in a previous chapter and is a 
significant contributor to the overall complexity of the tax system. This chapter considers 
further the issue of complexity of generic and real-life tax systems, especially the link 
between complexity and compliance costs. It also discusses briefly the factors to consider 
should simplification of the system be considered desirable. 
 
4.2 Definition and measurement of complexity of a tax system 
 
There are a number of possible definitions of tax complexity. Slemrod’s (1996) widely 
recognised  definition of the complexity of a tax system is the ‘total resource cost’ or the sum 
of compliance costs (incurred by individuals and businesses) and administrative costs 
(incurred by government) incurred in complying with the system’s requirements. This 
definition thus  provides a basic link between tax complexity and costs of compliance.  
 
4.3 Reasons for complexity of a tax system 
 
Tax systems become complex for a number of reasons. Donnelly and Young (2007) note that 
the responsibility for tax complexity ‘has been placed on all members of the tax community – 
judges, practitioners and governments’. Perhaps due to their ultimate responsibility for a tax 
system, the role of government tends to attract the most attention. 
As noted above, legislative complexity arises from factors including government policy 
preferences and the growth of anti-avoidance legislation. In addition to these two factors, 
Donnelly and Young (2007) consider a third cause of complexity to be government inaction 
‘Complexity…does not always arise from endless amendments of intricate rules, but can 
equally be caused by the lack of formal rule-making. When the legislature fails to provide, 
uncertainty is created. Taxpayers who are uncertain find it difficult to comply; therefore, we 
argue that complexity is reduced by tax measures that facilitate compliance’ 
The concept of equity is also significant for government to consider when contemplating 
change i.e. that taxpayers should be treated fairly. However, the relationship between equity 
and simplicity is not clear cut, and James (2006) notes that ‘Existing research disagrees 
whether there is a positive or negative correlation between simplicity and equity or whether 
the relationship is far more complex and subtle c.f. Milliron (1985) and Carnes and Cuccia 
(1996)’. 
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4.4 Structural factors leading to complexity 
 
Gale (2001) notes that legislative and overall complexity of a tax system can be influenced by 
structural elements such as the tax base, rate structure and allowable deductions as well as 
administrative features of the tax code. 
 
4.4.1 Tax rate structure 
 
Tax rates are either graduated, like those of the current UK income tax, or flat. Graduated 
rates may provide incentives to arbitrage and reduce overall liabilities across time or people 
leading to tax avoidance opportunities. Flat rate taxes can also allow more efficient 
administrative structures to function leading to lower compliance costs, since tax can easily 
be withheld at source.  
However, there is debate over the influence of tax rate structure on the complexity of a tax 
system. The number of tax rates might on first principles be thought to contribute to tax 
complexity, but in fact are generally thought not to do so. Slovenia is one Eastern European 
country that considered but rejected introducing a flat tax system. Analysis by Cajner et al 
(2006) noted that ‘there is little disagreement among tax system experts that the complexity of 
a tax system generally stems from deductions, exemptions and special treatments, while the 
number of tax brackets is largely irrelevant’. 
The analysis quoted Slemrod (1989), who in studying the effect of tax simplifying measures 
on compliance costs, concluded ‘significant resource savings can be expected from 
eliminating the system of itemised deductions, although no saving from changing to a single-
rate structure can be confidently predicted’. 
Other commentators such as Hall (1996) agree. He notes that direct tax complexity relates to 
issues with the tax base such as timing and the definition of taxable transactions rather than 
multiple rates of tax. In his opinion, a flat tax on a cash flow basis would remove these 
definition and timing issues for taxable income and hence increase simplicity. 
 
4.4.2 Deductions 
 
Universal exemptions, deductions and credits should in general cause relatively little 
complexity. However, when targeted, eligible taxpayers or activities can be hard to define and 
such confusion may provide tax planning opportunities and compliance difficulties (Teather, 
2005). 
Different administrative systems can also affect complexity; for example, withholding tax at 
source or removing the need to file a return could reduce compliance costs for individuals. 
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4.4.3 Other issues leading to complexity 
 
Gammie (2008) considers that complexity is generated by the concepts on which the 
legislation is built, the structure of the system in terms of tax rates and taxable units and the 
extent to which government achieves policy using the tax system. Reinforcing the principles 
of Gale (2001) above, he states ‘the growth in legislation is symptomatic of the complexity of 
the underlying concepts that need to be explained. Without any simplification of those 
underlying concepts – what it is we are trying to tax (the choice of tax base) and the tax 
structure (tax rates and taxable units) – the achievements in terms of tax simplification are 
likely to be small’. 
 
4.5 Measurement of complexity 
 
Slemrod (1996) notes that a number of issues may arise in trying to measure complexity of a 
tax system: 
 
• Permanent and transitory costs may differ – a new provision may raise costs initially as 
people learn about it but reduce costs over time 
• Only incremental costs should be included – companies would still keep records to meet 
legal obligations 
• Tax complexity is only a part of government policy which includes spending and other 
regulations – if tax complexity is reduced but recreated as part of spending overall 
complexity may rise 
 
More fundamentally, James (2008) notes that ‘the lack of a strict definition of ‘complexity’ or 
‘simplicity’ or of a robust quantifiable measure … makes it impossible to accurately ascertain 
any progress’. 
 
4.5.1 Conceptual issues in measuring complexity of a tax system 
 
Slemrod (1996) highlights a number of issues with the total resource cost. Firstly, it does not 
distinguish for the taxpayer between involuntary costs to comply with the law and 
discretionary costs incurred to evade or avoid taxes. A measure of how far a tax system 
encourages certain groups to incur large discretionary costs is often called ‘transactional 
complexity’. Administrative costs include both those of running the system and minimising 
evasion, and each should be considered in assessing the system’s simplicity. Similar points 
were raised in the UK studies of Sandford et al (1989). 
Secondly, the resource cost refers to social rather than private cost of collection. Costs of 
compliance are often tax deductible, so the private cost for the taxpayer is less than the social 
cost. Employers also earn interest on withheld taxes from employees before passing them on 
to HMRC, reducing their overall compliance costs. 
The total resource cost measure is useful, but may sometimes produce counter-intuitive 
results regarding simplicity.  As noted above, Slemrod (1996) points out the limitations of 
total resource cost and an apparently counter-intuitive result where record keeping and 
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calculation to claim a credit are relaxed to require only half the previous resource, the number 
of taxpayers claiming the credit increases and any measures to make up lost revenue do not 
increase other collection costs. Using the cost-based measure of simplicity, the system is now 
more complex. He considers this the correct result in that while the credit procedure is 
simpler, the overall tax system is more complicated. Equity and efficiency of the change will 
also have to be considered along with simplicity when analysing the success of the policy 
change. 
 
4.5.2 Difficulties in measuring complexity of the current system 
 
Slemrod (1996) identifies some difficulties in measuring the cost of the current tax system. 
Incremental costs are hard to measure for smaller firms in identifying accounting steps that 
could be foregone in the absence of taxation. Larger firms may be able to measure costs 
incurred by other departments more easily. More generally, records may still be required for 
certain purposes such as grants, so claims of cost savings should be treated with great care. 
In general, any attempt to make estimates of the costs involved will always have limitations, 
an example being that taxpayers who are dissuaded from economic activity by tax complexity 
are rarely included in samples. 
 
4.6 Disadvantages of complexity 
 
On the basis that complexity and compliance costs are linked, business will suffer increased 
costs when complexity of the tax system increases. James (2008) notes some further 
disadvantages of complexity in a tax system: 
 
• Making economic decisions more difficult by reducing clarity and certainty 
• Reduce taxpayer compliance, whether deliberately or through ignorance of the rules 
• Generating unfairness as not all taxpayers can take advantage of complexity in the system 
• Making discussion of tax policy and improvements more difficult 
 
In a similar vein in the USA, Hall (1996) identifies two types of economic cost created by the 
growth and regular revision of the tax code: 
 
• Overhead cost associated with tax planning, compliance and litigation 
• Economic opportunities foregone due to taxpayer uncertainty 
 
He notes that where tax cost cannot be easily predicted with certainty, business plans and 
investments are delayed and may reduce economic growth. 
 
4.7 Effect of complexity 
 
Following Slemrod’s (1996) definition of complexity above, the obvious way therefore to 
decide whether an actual tax system is complex is to measure its compliance and 
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administration costs. A number of studies have attempted to do this, although numbers 
quickly become outdated, limiting the application of results over time. However, a recurring 
theme is the difficulty in measuring costs, and especially in comparing them with other tax 
systems or countries. 
The US Treasury (2002) and Slemrod (1996) have estimated compliance costs of Federal 
income taxes to amount to 10% of revenue collected or about 1% of GDP. Slemrod mentions 
that the UK has a cost of 5% of revenue, but as already noted, predicting such figures is 
notoriously inaccurate. 
Gale and Holtzblatt (2000) state that the basic administrative goals of tax policy are that 
‘taxes should be easy to understand and comply with, and they should be enforced and 
administered in a competent and fair manner’. However, they note that these are difficult 
issues both for academics in putting a cost on compliance, and for policymakers where the 
goals conflict with each other, or other tax policy goals such as efficiency and equity. 
Their survey in 1993 concluded that the total cost for the Fortune 500 companies of 
corporation tax compliance was $1.055 billion, which they acknowledge is ‘difficult to 
dismiss’. Comparison with other countries was difficult due to different size of company used 
in the samples. The compliance costs for companies were shown to be much larger than the 
cost of administering the system. 
A study by Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996) considered the factors in the American tax 
system most likely to create high compliance costs for large companies as ‘depreciation rules, 
measurement and taxation of international income, the corporate alternative minimum tax and 
co-ordinating federal and state income taxes’ (the last two do not feature in the UK tax 
system). 
As noted above, however, compliance cost studies apparently carried out on a rigorous basis 
can give wildly contrasting results. Gale (2001) maintains that ‘the magnitude of compliance 
costs and the impact of tax complexity on firm operations is controversial’. He quotes two 
examples, the first being the multi-national group Mobil whose officials testified in Congress 
that its US tax return cost $10m to prepare, which only worked out at 0.25% of group profits, 
which seems very small. However, Seltzer (1997) claimed that Hewlett-Packard, then with 
annual turnover of $38.4 billion, was able to process its US federal tax return with only three 
full-time tax professionals, suggesting that its corporation tax compliance costs were not 
excessive, and the reason for the difference from Mobil’s total costs is unclear. 
 
4.8 Other compliance cost studies 
 
A number of other studies of compliance costs have been performed, some of whose results 
are noted below. 
Hall’s testimony in 1996 to the Ways & Means Committee compared the annual $157 billion 
cost of complying with the federal income tax as the economic waste involved in ‘destroying 
every vehicle produced by the Ford Motor Company and more than one third of the vehicles 
produced by the Chrysler Corporation in 1995’. 
Hall’s calculations show a total compliance cost to American business in 1996 of $105 billion 
which falls disproportionately on smaller businesses, a result which confirms that of Sandford 
(1989) in the UK mentioned above. He notes that a VAT study in the UK by Sandford in 
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1986 found that the compliance burden on the smallest companies was 647 times larger than 
those on the largest companies.  
However, Hall’s figures have been widely challenged. Slemrod believes Hall’s compliance 
figure is too high – although the total time spent as calculated by Hall is less than his own 
estimate, the average value of time is much higher, based as it is on a value in excess of wage 
rate. 
Several compliance cost studies have also been carried out in the UK. Apart from those of 
Sandford (1989) already mentioned, a PwC survey (2007) for The Hundred Group found that 
the 51 of the largest listed UK companies had on average 11.8 full time employees dealing 
with UK tax compliance work, and this number was considered to underestimate the true time 
spent.  
The study concluded that the total cost of UK tax compliance for the companies was 
calculated as £65.6m of which 49% related to corporation tax. On average, this represented 
0.4% of their tax payments (taxes borne and collected). Data on time spent was converted to a 
monetary cost using a standard salary and benefits cost by grade and adding a percentage for 
overheads. The survey also attempted to include time spent by staff other than members of the 
central tax department on tax affairs – the ‘shadow’ tax department. 
The above give merely a flavour of the large amount of academic literature on compliance 
costs and the complexity of tax systems, the breadth of which only serves to illustrate the cost 
magnitude and importance of the issue. 
 
4.9 Simplification of a tax system 
 
4.9.1 Definition of tax simplicity 
 
Cooper (1993) has suggested there are at least seven issues to consider for a tax rule to be 
called simple, which can easily be extended to consider a whole tax system: 
 
• Predictability – the rule and its scope were easily and accurately understood by taxpayers 
and advisers 
• Proportionality – the complexity of the solution was no more than reasonably necessary to 
achieve the intended aim 
• Consistency – dealt with similar issues in the same way without needing to make arbitrary 
distinctions 
• Compliance – easy for taxpayers to comply without incurring excessive costs 
• Administration – easy for a revenue authority to administer 
• Coordination – fitted appropriately with other tax rules – complicated if its relationships 
with other rules were obscure 
• Expression – clearly expressed 
 
Cooper (1993) reasons that simplification throughout a tax system can be at different levels, 
namely: 
 
• Choice of tax base 
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• Design of the rules applied to the tax base 
• Expression of those rules 
• Compliance requirements imposed on taxpayers 
 
As a result, therefore, simplification in one area or level will therefore not necessarily 
simplify the overall tax system. 
 
4.10 Simplest theoretical tax system 
 
Slemrod (1996) answered his own query ‘which is the simplest tax system of them all?’ with 
‘a lump-sum tax’ for the following reasons: 
 
• The base is clearly and easily defined, such as being a resident over the age of 21 
• The levy itself is clearly and easily defined 
• The taxpayer cannot easily manipulate either the rate or base – in particular the latter. The 
base does not depend on any economic decision of the taxpayer 
 
He considers the main reason for the scarcity of such taxes to be their perceived inequality 
with persons earning different incomes paying the same amount of tax, as evidenced in the 
English poll tax riot of 1381. In more recent times, the 1989 UK ‘Community Charge’ was 
not a success and administrative costs of collection more than tripled in its first year. 
Compliance issues were important; to enforce a tax, taxpayers must be located and dealt with 
when they do not pay. Slemrod (1996) commented on the issue of non-compliance ‘the 
simplicity of a tax system can be assessed only with respect to a standard of enforcement’. 
This is likely to be a significant factor in a comparative analysis of the simplicity or 
complexity of different tax systems.  
 
4.11 Desirability of tax simplification 
 
Gale (2001) has identified three key issues that are relevant in deciding if simplification of a 
tax system is desirable: 
 
• The fundamental question is not the overall level of complexity but whether the tax system 
provides good value for the complexity it creates. This depends on the size and incidence 
of the costs and benefits of complexity, which includes the extent to which it achieves 
other policy goals 
 
• Factors that generate complexity in tax systems such as policy trade-offs, politics and 
taxpayer avoidance are not features of tax policies and would remain in force even if the 
tax system were reformed. Analysis of how policy changes will affect tax complexity 
should incorporate these factors 
 
• There is an important distinction between private and social costs. Taxpayers taking 
advantage of a targeted subsidy would not regard the complexity it created as 
unfavourable, but such a subsidy may have to be balanced by an initial higher rate 
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It may therefore be seen that the need to simplify a tax system may not necessarily be 
obvious, and any such simplification process may not be easy. Slemrod (1996) acknowledges 
that there are many less complex ways to raise the current amount of revenue (looking 
specifically at the US tax system), but whether these should be adopted depends on what the 
current complexity achieves or ‘personalisation’. He notes that some complexity gives 
perceived fairness while others give none and attempt to encourage certain types of 
behaviour, which causes distortion and complexity. 
 
4.12 Benefits of a simpler tax system 
 
Gale (2001) identified a number of general benefits of less complex taxes: 
 
• Reduction of taxpayers’ costs of complying with the system in terms of money, time and 
mental anguish – this would reduce the overall taxation burden 
• Simpler provisions are more likely to be used 
• Compliance rates may rise as evasion will fall. To some extent people do not pay tax if 
they do not understand tax law, and simple tax rules should be easier to enforce. Evidence 
also suggests people evade tax if they think it unfair or that others are reaping more benefit 
from the system 
• Generation of more public support and hence part of any effort to improve delivery of 
government services. Graetz (1997) finds the biggest complaint about the tax system for 
many is not the amount of tax they pay but the sheer and apparently needless complexity 
of what seem to be everyday tax situations 
 
Stepanyan (2003) also notes the importance of simplicity in designing a tax system. In his 
view, complexity undermines administration due to enforcement difficulties and may hence 
lead to a fall in compliance. Multiple rate structures and numerous exemptions mean that 
administrations with limited resources may struggle to prevent significant evasion. He notes 
that non-revenue objectives, including simplification, are not easily quantified, and hence the 
measurement of a tax reform’s success usually focuses on quantities easy to measure such as 
revenue generation. 
 
Nicholson (2006) identifies a number of advantages of a simple tax system for the UK His 
observations are relatively uncontroversial, but he makes no attempt to quantify such benefits, 
some of which may not be significant: 
 
i) Lower compliance costs 
 
A simpler tax system would lead to quicker and easier assessment and collection and reduce 
time and money spent on completing tax returns by individuals and businesses. Tax 
complexity and the need for tax advice both act against less wealthy members of society. 
 
ii) Lower collection costs 
 
A simpler system would require fewer administrators and leave fewer loopholes to be 
exploited and then closed. 
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iii) Transparency and accountability 
 
Simpler taxes make the overall tax burden more transparent and help voters make more 
informed decisions. 
 
iv) Improved parliamentary scrutiny 
 
Long and complex finance bills make effective scrutiny difficult. A survey of MPs in 2001 by 
the CIOT found that 82% are unable to complete their own returns correctly, calling into 
question their ability to perform their scrutiny role. 
 
v) Fewer errors 
 
Complexity of the system is partly responsible for the large number of errors in the system 
including one eighth of taxpayers under PAYE paying at the wrong rate (2007a NAO report). 
 
vi) Less distortion 
 
Simpler taxes means economic behaviour is less distorted by complexity in the tax system. 
 
Nicholson (2006) describes flat tax as ‘the ultimate expression of tax simplification’. He notes 
that all the current complexity in the forms of deductions and exemptions were made in the 
pursuit of equity or encouraging certain desirable economic or social behaviour, and that 
simplification by removal of such distortions is bound to leave some taxpayers worse off. 
 
He also notes some ways in which taxes could easily be simplified. His suggestions for 
corporation tax include allowing companies to carry all types of losses forwards or back 
against any form of profit, thus abolishing the complex existing rules for different types of 
loss. Another suggestion is a single capital allowance treatment for all types of business asset, 
again simplifying the complicated existing capital allowance rules. 
 
4.13 Simplifying an existing tax system 
 
From the above, given that the simplest theoretical ‘lump sum’ tax system is unlikely to be 
possible to put into practice, it would seem necessary to start any process of simplification 
from within an existing system. 
 
4.13.1 Principles 
 
Gale (2001) states ‘the key to tax simplification is to make fewer distinctions across economic 
and personal characteristics…In short, broadening the base and reducing the rates, which in 
general may be considered efficiency-enhancing, would also simplify taxes’. He gives the 
following principles necessary to achieve this: 
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• Taxes should be imposed on a broad base at relatively low rates that do not vary by 
income source or expenditure type 
• Progressivity should be embodied in the rate structure and tax base, not specific provisions 
• Universal exemptions, deductions and credits are much simpler than targeted ones 
• Taxing capital gains as ordinary income directly removes major sources of complexity 
• Using revenue raised to increase standard deductions removes people from the tax system 
and reducing tax rates reduces the value of sheltering and cheating 
• Increasing the numbers with the same basic rate facilitates withholding at source which 
further simplifies taxes and increase compliance 
 
These plans have been called ‘populist simplification’ by Slemrod (1996) in that they may 
make taxes simpler for many people, but the overall compliance cost saving may be small.  
 
4.13.2 Legislative process 
 
James (2008) states ‘the way to achieve lasting improvement in terms of simplification is to 
include it systematically in the process of tax reform generally’. Simplification is incidental to 
government in setting tax policy (Slemrod and Blumenthal, 1996), but he gives four main 
ways to achieve this: 
 
• Evaluate the importance of different aims of tax policy 
• Incorporate simplification into the tax policy process itself 
• Develop a simplification culture 
• Monitor and review progress 
 
The 2006 Tax Reform Commission suggested creation of a Joint Parliamentary Select 
Committee to improve parliamentary scrutiny of tax legislation, as well as an Office of Tax 
Simplification (OTS) reporting to the Committee. The OTS would review current tax law and 
propose simplification, and examine proposed legislation to see if it was consistent with 
principles of tax law and reasonably simple. However, James (2008) acknowledges the 
danger of such a body being sidelined by tight deadlines, and repeats his thoughts of 
simplification being incorporated into tax reform  as being a more effective solution. 
The creation of such bodies is not an idea unique to the UK. Dalsgaard (2005) notes the 
formation in the USA of an Advisory Panel on Tax Reform by the Secretary of the Treasury, 
one of whose aims is to submit a revenue-neutral proposal which will ‘simplify federal tax 
laws to reduce the costs and administrative burdens of compliance with such laws’. 
 
4.14 Potential success of simplification strategies 
 
Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996) point out that reduction of compliance costs through 
simplifying the tax process has not been an important part of government’s tax policy because 
there is no natural constituency and little data concerning total costs or alternative policies. As 
a result, more complexity has been the inevitable result. 
However, studies do show that simplification of a tax system may be possible. The authors 
note that tax simplification can occur in either tax base simplification or tax rate 
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simplification. Their study investigated the effect of simplification of the tax base on 
compliance costs using tax professional advice as the indicator. While its use is not a perfect 
indicator of the complexity of the tax system, the authors agree with Gale and Rohaly (2003) 
that it is ‘simple and straightforward’ and is evidence of the taxpayer’s view of the system’s 
complexity. 
The study shows that tax base simplification reduces use of tax advice, indicating a reduction 
in complexity of the system and compliance costs by about six per cent. 
 
4.15 Conclusion 
 
Complexity and simplification of a tax system are by nature wide-ranging and intellectually 
demanding topics. While causes and effects of complexity are not difficult to identify, its 
measurement is controversial. Compliance cost studies have a valuable part to play, but their 
results need to be analysed with care. While simplification appears at first glance achievable 
and desirable, the practical chances of its occurrence remain subject to debate. 
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5. Flat tax – theoretical background 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The history of flat tax falls into two distinct phases. The first phase was the development of a 
theoretical tax system by American academics throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the most 
dominant model being the Hall Rabushka (HR) flat tax. The second phase was the actual 
introduction of tax systems known as ‘flat taxes’ from the early 1990s to date, pioneered by a 
number of Eastern European countries, henceforth classified by this thesis as ‘EE flat tax’. 
It is vital to bear in mind that the flat taxes of the second phase bear little relation to the HR 
flat tax or its associated theoretical models. It is obvious that certain commentators do not 
appreciate this fact, leading to a general lack of coherence in the flat tax debate which has 
been described by Keen et al (2006) as ‘marked more by rhetoric and assertion than by 
analysis and evidence’. Much of the argument to date has focussed on issues such as the 
reduction in marginal rates of tax paid by the highest earning individuals on the introduction 
of a flat tax system, and whether overall tax revenue would decrease. Other aspects of the 
‘flatness’ of flat tax, including its proposed simplifying features, have been subject to little 
analysis. 
This chapter considers generic definitions of the flat tax concept before examining separately 
the theoretical properties of both the HR and EE flat taxes. 
 
5.2 Definitions of ‘flat tax’ 
 
Generic definitions of flat tax may apply to both HR and EE flat tax systems. A short but 
useful description was provided by the UK Treasury in their 2005 report which defined a flat 
tax as ‘A tax structure that has a single positive marginal tax rate’. 
In the USA, the US General Accounting Office (1998) prepared a report which noted that the 
term ‘flat tax’ could refer to any system with a single tax rate using either a consumption or 
income base, but chose the HR flat tax to analyse. The Joint Committee on Taxation produced 
a report in 2005 discussing issues relating to flat tax proposals which considered a flat tax to 
be ‘any tax system with only one marginal tax rate [above zero] and a broad base’. Many flat 
tax systems, both theoretical and actual, substantially alter the existing tax base, a point 
deemed important enough to be included in this generic definition of a flat tax.  
A final definition is provided by Weisbach (2000) who considered the design and 
implementation of the HR flat tax. He identified immediately the problem of defining the 
term ‘flat tax’ and gave a generic definition of ‘any tax that has a proportional rather than 
progressive rate structure’.  
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5.3 Hall-Rabushka (HR) flat tax 
 
5.3.1 Background 
 
The first use of the term ‘flat tax’ was coined in the work of two American academics: Robert 
Hall and Alvin Rabushka of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Their proposed flat 
tax system was published in the Wall Street Journal in 1981 and expanded in their book ‘The 
Flat Tax’ (1995). The HR flat tax system was put into a draft legislative form by Richard 
Armey and Richard Shelby and given political prominence by a number of American 
politicians, most notably the Republican Steve Forbes (2005), who used its principles in his 
bid for nomination as his party’s presidential candidate. 
The HR flat tax is a theoretical model tax system designed to replace the entire American tax 
system. Its publication originally stimulated debate in the USA throughout the 1980s and 
1990s and reached Europe during this second decade, especially following the novel tax 
reforms seen in Eastern European countries. 
In practice, no country has adopted the HR flat tax in its pure form and it remains a theoretical 
model only. None of the countries that have introduced tax reforms described by some as ‘flat 
taxes’ have altered their tax base from income to consumption, probably the single most 
significant difference between the HR flat tax and the current UK and US tax systems. All 
countries which have introduced flat taxes already had a consumption tax in the form of a 
value added tax (VAT), a tax which does not exist in the USA.  
 
5.3.2 Definition 
 
A succinct definition of the HR flat tax is provided by the Congressional Research Service of 
the Library of the US Congress (2005) who describe it as ‘a wage tax and a cash-flow tax on 
business (A wage tax is a tax only on salaries and wages; a cash flow tax is generally a tax on 
gross receipts minus all outlays)… It is essentially a modified VAT, with wages and pensions 
subtracted from the VAT base and taxed at the individual level’. Both taxes are levied at the 
same, single, ‘flat’ rate, with a tax free personal allowance for individuals. 
Businesses pay tax on the difference between their gross sales and the sum of wages, pension 
contributions and purchases from other businesses, including the cost of materials, services 
and capital purchases. Individuals pay tax on their wages (including benefits in kind) and 
pension disbursements, less personal exemptions.  
 
Feld (1995) provides a more comprehensive definition of the HR flat tax: 
 
‘The [HR] flat tax converts the income tax into a national tax on consumption, whose 
economic effects resemble those of a value-added tax. It consists of two parts, a tax on 
individuals and a tax on businesses. The two taxes, taken together, create an ‘airtight’ system 
for including income in the tax base once and only once, as close to the source as possible. 
The rate is the same for both taxes. It hovers around 20% and varies with the proposal. 
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The tax on individuals generally includes only wages and other compensation paid in cash 
and pensions. (Correspondingly, businesses may deduct these payments). Dividends, interest, 
rent and capital gains are not taxed to individuals. Nor may individuals claim the personal 
deductions currently available for mortgage interest, state and local taxes, charitable gifts, 
medical expenses and the like. The individual tax becomes progressive at the lower end 
through a personal allowance or standard deduction. The earned-income credit1, however, 
would disappear. 
The business tax is intended to act as a comprehensive withholding tax on all types of income 
other than wages. The business tax covers all businesses, including partnerships and sole 
proprietorships. Accounting for business transactions is intended to follow cash receipts and 
disbursements.  
The tax base consists generally of gross receipts for the sale or exchange of property or 
services less the cost of business inputs, wages and retirement contributions. No deduction 
may be claimed for fringe benefits, employer’s national insurance or local (including 
property) taxes. The tax provides current expensing of all property purchased for a business; 
thus, if a corporation purchases a factory, it may deduct the cost of the land, buildings and 
equipment. The tax eliminates depreciation and inventory accounting, defers deductions until 
payment and repeals percentage depletion. The current deduction of all business inputs has 
the effect of exempting from tax the future income derived from business assets calculated at 
a normal rate of return. Current expensing of business investment essentially converts the 
business income tax base into a value-added tax base. 
Businesses may claim no deduction for interest or dividends paid and do not include financial 
income when received. A special set of rules applies to banks and other financial institutions 
to tax income on services ‘bundled’ with lending transactions. Any excess of deductions over 
income carries over into the following year with interest added at the 3 month Treasury bill 
rate’. 
 
5.3.3 Comparison with current UK tax base 
 
It is abundantly clear from the table below that the HR flat tax is very different from the 
current UK tax system. The key difference between the two is the tax base; the UK’s income 
tax and corporation tax are levied on income whereas the HR flat tax is levied on 
consumption i.e. spending (Murphy, 2006). The consumption basis of the HR flat tax is 
described in detail below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 A refundable tax credit on earned income for low to moderate income working individuals and families. 
Congress originally approved the tax credit legislation in 1975 in part to offset the burden of social 
security taxes and to provide an incentive to work. When EITC exceeds the amount of taxes owed, it 
results in a tax refund to those who claim and qualify for the credit. 
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A comparison of the flat tax base with existing system for a business is shown below: 
 
 Current UK system HR flat tax 
Sales of goods and services Taxable Taxable 
Sales of business assets Gain included Included 
Sales of financial assets Gain included Not included 
Loan and new stock issues Not included Not included 
Purchases of goods and 
services for business 
purposes 
Deducted Deducted 
Purchase of capital goods Depreciated over time Deducted immediately 
Wages paid Deducted Deducted 
Interest paid Deducted Not deducted 
Dividends paid Not deducted Not deducted 
Charitable donations Deducted Not deducted 
Capital gains Taxable Not taxable 
 
Comparison of HR flat tax base with the current UK system (Murphy, 2006, p12) 
5.3.4 Claimed benefits of an HR flat tax 
 
The following summary (Murphy 2006) lists the benefits claimed for the introduction of the 
HR flat tax in the USA by Hall and Rabushka and other supporters: 
Simplification 
• Simplifying the tax code 
• Reducing the burdens on individuals who have to file tax returns 
• Simplifying business administration 
• Cutting the number of state employees who administer tax 
• Reducing the number of taxpayers 
Enhance the credibility of the tax system 
• Reducing the average tax rate 
• Reducing the incentives for tax evasion 
• Cutting or eliminating tax avoidance 
• Closing all loopholes used for tax abuse 
• Increasing the fairness of the tax system 
Boost the economy 
• Stimulating the economy 
• Reducing inflationary pressure 
• Reducing interest rates 
• Encouraging saving 
• Stimulating investment 
• Encouraging international competition 
• Improving corporate transparency 
Increase social well-being 
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• Providing increased incentives for work 
• Protecting wealth 
• Supporting the family 
• Enhancing the status of government 
 
In a similar vein, Paulus and Peichl (2003) consider the following three potential benefits of a 
flat tax to be most attractive for Western European countries (although they considered EE 
rather than HR flat tax, the apparent advantages still apply): 
• Enhance labour supply incentives – especially for highest earners which has issues for 
equity 
• Increase compliance and reduce evasion through lower rates – an effect expected to be 
more prevalent in developing countries starting from a lower base 
• As a part of fundamental tax reforms income taxation can be significantly simplified 
 
From a specifically UK perspective, Grecu (2004) promotes an HR flat tax for the UK on the 
basis that it would attract international business activity to the UK and stimulate the economy, 
based largely on the historic linking of tax cuts under Thatcher in the UK and Reagan in the 
USA in the 1980s with the observed economic outperformance at the time. In his opinion, the 
main benefits would be: 
• Elimination of double taxation on savings and investments 
• Increase in government revenue 
• Considerable reduction in the time and cost of completing tax forms 
• The end of special interest lobbying, which is responsible for the growing complexity of 
the tax regime 
• Exemption of the poor from paying any tax by means of a generous tax-free allowance 
• More control by individuals over their money and reduction of government infringements 
on privacy 
• Reduction of interest rates because interest would be tax-free 
• Reduction of tax evasion by lowering the benefit from avoiding taxes 
• The British fiscal system would be more attractive to foreign investment 
• Simplicity, economic efficiency and fairness 
 
It would at first sight be fair to say that the majority of these claimed benefits are subject to 
much debate. However, it is apparently common ground among both supporters and 
opponents of both an HR or EE flat tax for the UK that simplification of tax legislation and 
indeed the whole tax system would occur on introduction. This might be predicted to lead to a 
reduction in compliance costs. The claims of simplification are the particular focus of this 
thesis as the flat tax debate in the UK has often appeared to take this as given and focus more 
upon the issues of equity and redistribution of the tax burden. 
With the continuing importance of the desire for tax simplification, the claims of flat tax 
advocates on this issue need more detailed examination. 
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5.3.5 Consumption tax base 
 
5.3.5.1 Background 
 
One of the more radical features of the HR flat tax, especially unusual to UK observers, is its 
consumption base. The following section provides some theoretical background on the nature 
of such a base, based largely on the work of Weisbach (2000). 
The majority of observed tax systems are predominantly based on one of two tax bases: 
consumption or income. The aim of a consumption tax is to capture all consumption; rather 
than a direct tax on consumption, this can also be done starting from income on the basis that 
income is the sum of consumption and change in savings for a period. This will need to be 
done on a cash flow rather than accruals basis, as is the case for the HR flat tax. 
 
Two important consequences of the cash flow basis are that: 
 
• Investments are expensed under a cash flow consumption tax but not under an income tax 
(relief is obtained on recovery of the investment) 
• A consumption tax does not tax the yield on investments 
 
As the table above shows, these are key differences from the UK income-based tax system. 
 
A consumption base may be created in different ways: 
 
• Measure directly all acts of consumption – this would be difficult in practice requiring a 
new reporting framework and definition of taxable consumption activities 
• Use the definition of consumption as income minus saving by including income from all 
sources then allowing a savings deduction – this would be administratively difficult 
• Include only earned income in the tax base – taxpayers claim no savings deduction but 
returns are tax-free (as in the HR flat tax) 
 
 
5.3.5.2 Taxation of capital 
 
A cash flow consumption tax can be replicated by not taxing the gain on assets sold and 
giving no deduction for the purchaser. This method is known as yield exemption and is used 
in the HR flat tax for non-business assets such as housing. If these two methods (cash flow 
consumption tax and yield exemption) are equivalent, this would imply that the cash flow 
consumption tax is simply a wage tax as there are two types of resource: labour and capital 
(the return to which is exempt).  
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Weisbach (2000) points out two exceptions to this equivalence: 
 
• A cash flow tax taxes certain returns in excess of the market rate of return (known as 
inframarginal2 returns) 
• Transitional effects on moving from an income to consumption tax will be significant as 
on the date of change, existing wealth is taxed on its present value 
 
To summarise: 
 
• A cash flow tax taxes wages, inframarginal returns to capital and all existing capital on a 
one time basis 
• A yield exempt tax taxes only wages; inframarginal returns are exempt as is the yield on 
all capital 
 
 
5.3.5.3 Existing forms of consumption tax 
 
A number of different consumption taxes are already in existence. A retail sales tax is a direct 
tax on consumption purchases, calculated on each purchase and remitted by the vendor. If 
applied to all purchases it would be equivalent to a cash flow consumption tax. 
A VAT (value-added tax) is a method of collecting a retail sales tax which collects tax at each 
stage of production rather than just at the point of retail sale. This makes avoidance more 
difficult as transactions may be linked together by the revenue authorities. A VAT that 
deducts purchases and includes sales is called ‘subtraction method’. There is no deduction for 
wages and deductions are only allowed on items where the tax has already been paid. 
Several European countries including the UK operate a ‘credit invoice’ VAT where 
businesses get credit against tax for taxes already paid by the supplier instead of a deduction 
although the effect is the same. 
 
5.3.5.4 Basis of the HR flat tax 
 
The HR flat tax acts as a subtraction method VAT but businesses get a deduction for wages 
and individuals are taxed on their wages. Individuals are not taxed on investment income and 
wages could be taxed on a progressive basis if required. 
Weisbach (2000) described the HR flat tax as a consumption-type, origin-based value added 
tax (VAT) collected by the subtraction method supplemented by a non-refundable tax credit 
against labour income. The tax base of a subtraction VAT is the difference between a 
business’s sales and purchases; for a consumption-type VAT capital goods are also excluded. 
An origin-based VAT taxes exports but not imports and is thus a tax on goods produced in the 
country; the more usual destination-based VAT exempts exports and taxes imports so the tax 
base is domestic consumption. 
2 An investment has an inframarginal return if one cannot invest additional cash at the same rate. The 
inframarginal return is the return on the investment above the normal rate of return i.e. the rate of return 
on any additional cash invested 
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As the HR flat tax has a wage tax and a consumption tax taxes wages, inframarginal returns 
and existing capital, as discussed above, the only reason for the business-level tax must be to 
tax existing capital and inframarginal returns, which is very different from European VAT 
where the business-level tax taxes all consumption. 
The business-level tax does not apply to all capital e.g. personal residences are taxed under 
the yield-exempt method. Multiple methods of taxing capital under the HR flat tax are not 
necessarily efficient. Capital that is tax exempt may mean more of the tax burden falls on 
labour and transition tax (see below) will be avoidable by schemes such as buying exempt 
assets. 
 
Weisbach (2000) summarises the above in making the following three main points about the 
HR flat tax:  
 
• It is a progressive consumption tax (i.e. two rates of zero and the ‘flat’ rate) 
• The business-level tax exists only to tax existing capital wealth and inframarginal returns  
• It imposes multiple methods of taxing capital 
 
 
5.3.6 Transition rules 
 
The need for transition rules during implementation of an HR flat tax is an important issue 
since, as indicated above, moving from an income to consumption base would lead to a one-
off tax on existing capital. Different kinds of transition rules are possible: a yield exempt 
system would not tax existing capital but a retail sales tax would. The HR flat tax has no 
specific rules and thus presumably attempts to tax existing wealth. 
Any attempt by government to offer relief from a one-off transition tax raises issues of 
economics, equity and policy. Most efficiency analyses assume some form of relief is 
inevitable since the amounts of wealth and tax involved without it would be large. However, 
removal of the tax liability on existing wealth, usually held by the most wealthy taxpayers, 
would severely reduce the efficiency and progressivity of the new system. 
To reduce avoidance of any transition tax, the HR flat tax would need to introduce a number 
of rules which would greatly add to the complexity of the tax system.  
 
5.4 Eastern European (EE) flat taxes 
 
As noted in the introduction, there are two very different types of flat tax: the theoretical HR 
model (and its associated variants) and the real-life EE flat taxes. It is this latter category that 
has reignited the flat tax debate in the UK. 
During the last fifteen years a number of Eastern European countries have reformed their tax 
systems by introducing regimes which have collectively become known as ‘flat taxes’. 
Similar systems had already been introduced in certain countries including Hong Kong 
(1947), Jersey (1940) and Guernsey (1960), but the more recent adopters may be grouped 
conveniently into two ‘waves’. The first wave commenced with Estonia in 1994 and the 
second with Russia in 2001. Although flat taxes have been debated keenly in the UK and the 
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rest of Western Europe, none of these countries has yet adopted similar systems, so the results 
of the new tax systems have been analysed with some interest. 
 
 
5.4.1 Background 
 
The EE flat tax systems vary widely in their design, as will become evident. Their only 
common feature is that their tax on labour income may be described in symbolic form, as per 
Keen et al (2006): 
TF(Y) = max[t.(Y-AF),0] 
Where: 
TF(Y) is the tax liability on income of Y 
t is the single marginal rate of tax (the ‘flat’ rate) 
AF  is a tax-free allowance given to the taxpayer 
 
Keen’s formula still meets the UK Treasury’s (2005) generic definition of a flat tax. The flat 
rate used to calculate the tax may be the same for both corporation and income tax, as under 
the HR flat tax, but in practice this is unusual among the EE flat taxes. Keen’s (2006) analysis 
of the Eastern European flat taxes only considers tax systems that follow the above equation 
for PIT, incorporating as it does a personal allowance which is an important design 
component of these real-life flat taxes.  
 
5.5 Theoretical analysis of the EE flat taxes  
 
Keen et al (2006) undertook a detailed analysis of the EE flat tax systems and their results are 
discussed below. There is a large amount of academic literature on behavioural and overall 
tax revenue effects of changing tax rates (Heath, 2006), issues which, as already noted, have 
been prominent in the flat tax debate. However, there has been little analysis of the effect of 
‘flatness’ per se, although as Keen et al (2006) point out ‘it is difficult (perhaps impossible) to 
disentangle these empirically from those of the accompanying tax increases or reductions that 
movement to a flat tax implies’. 
 
5.5.1 Possible optimality of a flat tax 
 
Keen et al (2006) note that there is a tradition of academic work which seeks to see if a flat 
tax rate could be an optimal rate. Early work on income tax optimality by Mirrlees (1971), 
well before the advent of flat taxes, concluded that ‘[p]erhaps the most striking feature of the 
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results is the closeness to linearity of the [optimal] tax schedules’. The work considered that 
given the practical difficulties of a non-linear tax schedule, including administration, 
compliance and potential for tax avoidance by arbitrage between different rates, this implies 
that a flat tax is close to the best possible form of income tax. 
Later work such as Tuomala (1990) disputes these conclusions, and further chapters of this 
thesis will dispute the scale and ability of flat tax to solve the above ‘practical difficulties’. 
However, there remains no clinching theoretical reason why the optimal tax schedule is 
progressive i.e. one where the average tax rate increases with increasing levels of income. 
Despite this, the UK and other Western economies maintain a progressive system, probably 
driven by political concerns over the perceived equity of the tax system. 
A different case in support of linear rates appears in analysis of tax evasion and corruption in 
the tax collection process. Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo (1999) showed that a linear tax, set at 
an appropriate rate and combined with an appropriate penalty structure and simple wage 
payment to tax inspectors, maximises revenue without inducing tax evasion or bribes. These 
were significant issues for those Eastern European countries who have adopted the flat tax. 
However, such arguments are much less significant in the UK which has a far more 
developed and less corrupt collection system. 
There is also a political argument for linearity from those who see government as wasteful 
rather than benevolent, in a tradition dating from Brennan & Buchanan (1977) and continuing 
to Hall and Rabushka and other flat tax supporters today. A flat tax may act to restrict 
government’s ability to spend by reducing overall tax revenue (Murphy, 2006).  
 
5.5.2 Progressivity 
 
A progressive tax is one where the average rate of tax increases with increasing income, and a 
flat tax with a tax-free personal allowance achieves this for individuals. When analysing the 
impact of a flat tax upon progressivity, therefore, the issue at stake is how it compares to the 
tax structure it replaces. 
 
5.5.2.1 Introduction 
 
Keen et al’s (2006) analysis assumes that pre-tax income is independent of the income tax 
structure in place although the effect of tax evasion on moving to a flat tax is also considered. 
The fundamental concept at stake is that a tax structure is more progressive than another if, 
under its provisions, the poorest per cent p of taxpayers pay a smaller share of tax revenue for 
all p. 
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5.5.2.2 Progressivity comparison with full compliance 
 
The examples below first consider the case where the flat tax and its predecessor raise the 
same revenue, and then move on to the scenario where this is not the case. Finally, the effect 
of non-compliance on progressivity is examined. 
 
5.5.2.3 Revenue neutral comparison 
 
Progressivity will be affected by both the new tax-free allowance and the new flat tax rate. 
Considering the allowances first, Keen et al (2006) note that where the tax-free allowance 
under a flat tax is lower than its predecessor progressive tax, following the above the flat tax 
is clearly less progressive. This was the situation under the Georgian flat tax where there is no 
allowance, but they note that the reform was not revenue neutral so comparison of 
progressivity before and after reform is difficult. Where the allowance is greater under the flat 
tax the picture is not so clear. Clearly, more people will pay no tax so the reform cannot 
definitely lead to less progressivity. 
When examining the effect of the change of rate on progressivity, two situations can be 
envisaged. Where the flat tax rate is at least equal to (or higher than) the highest marginal rate 
under the progressive tax, the flat tax is definitely more progressive. This was the situation 
with the Lithuanian flat tax, but again the reform was not revenue neutral. 
The second situation arises where the flat tax rate is between lowest and highest pre-reform 
marginal rates, typically seen in those countries in the second wave after Russia. Here, neither 
tax structure is definitely more progressive. In addition, none of the second wave reforms 
were revenue neutral. 
In general, Keen et al (2006) note that all things being equal, a flat tax is more likely to be 
more progressive than the progressive system it replaces the higher the rate at which it is set. 
However, as none of the reforms were revenue neutral, this conclusion is presently of 
academic interest only. 
 
5.5.2.4 Non-equal yield comparisons 
 
Keen et al (2006) note that in this scenario it is necessary to distinguish between the effect of 
introducing a flat tax on the distribution across the population of taxpayers of tax payments 
(related to progressivity) and the distribution of their after-tax income. Where total tax 
revenue is unchanged, as above, the effect is obviously the same. Where tax revenue differs, 
the change in distribution of net income reflects changes in distribution of tax payments as 
well as their overall level. 
Hemming and Keen (1983) show the results in the above section still apply if re-expressed in 
terms of normalised tax or net income schedules which are derived from actual numbers by 
dividing by each aggregate yield. The relevant comparison is now between pre-reform tax and 
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a notional flat tax with the same allowance as the actual flat tax but marginal rate equal to the 
actual rate multiplied by the ratio of revenue raised by pre-reform tax to flat tax. 
Where reform led to a revenue loss, the Georgian reform shows clearly less progressivity 
whereas in more typical second wave reforms the effect on distribution of tax payments 
remains unclear. Where revenue increased such as in Lithuania the impact on distribution of 
tax payments is unclear, both due to the lack of clear data. 
It is clear that a number of other considerations are involved in assessing distributional impact 
on incomes, but the above analysis shows the wide range of potential impacts. 
 
5.5.2.5 Effect of non-compliance on progressivity 
 
As noted above, an important objective for several Eastern European countries in moving to a 
flat tax was to improve compliance from its existing weak level; non-compliance may thus 
affect the distributional impacts of reforms. 
Using a compliance behaviour model in the style of Slemrod (2001), Keen et al (2006) show 
that non-compliance leads to the flat tax becoming more progressive with the less well-off 
gaining a greater proportional benefit than the better off by evading tax. The situation is 
exactly the opposite for the pre-reform progressive tax, but the authors stress that these results 
must be taken with care, due to the lack of clear data available on sensitive areas such as non-
compliance. 
 
5.5.3 Work incentives 
 
5.5.3.1 Principles 
 
The comments of Paulus and Peichl (2008) as noted above are typical among supporters of 
flat tax such as Heath (2008), who claim that incentives to work would be enhanced, driven 
by a lower marginal rate of tax. However, Keen et al (2006) conclude that from a theoretical 
point of view, the effect of moving to a flat tax on work incentives is ‘replete with 
ambiguities’. 
Among the highest earners, who see the greatest change in tax rates, the income effect i.e. 
working to maintain income, suggests lower efforts. However, the substitution effect, where 
reward for surrendering leisure is increased, acts in the opposite direction and suggests greater 
efforts. This is the group of taxpayers that in theory would act to increase their overall output 
after seeing their tax rates fall. Previous work such as Goolsbee (1999) found that the 
response of this group to changes in tax rates was very limited. 
The impact of introducing a flat tax on encouraging people into work is also ambiguous. The 
enhanced personal allowance may act to encourage lower paid workers to work harder or to 
join the workforce, while middle earners facing a higher marginal rate may in theory 
withdraw from the workforce. This behaviour may be reinforced if, like the Slovak Republic, 
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the benefit system is reformed at the same time to encourage people into work (Miklos et al, 
2005). 
 
5.5.3.2 Evidence 
 
Keen et al (2006) note that the consensus of academic literature reviewing the impact of tax 
reform on labour supply decisions is that the effect of changes on primary workers is modest 
and could be used to simulate the effects of introducing a flat tax. 
Russia is the only EE flat tax country to have been studied in detail. Ivanova et al (2001) used 
household panel data (Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey) taking the large group of 
taxpayers little affected by the cut in the income tax rate as a control and comparing them to 
those whose tax rates were significantly reduced. The difference between the two groups 
before and after reform, assisted by the existence of a ready made control group, should in 
theory have thrown some light on the reform itself. 
However, the study uncovered little evidence that reform had a great effect on work effort – 
neither taxpayers’ gross income nor hours worked increased more in the treatment group than 
the control group. In fact, whenever the difference in work effort was significant, increased 
effort was shown in the control group who were supposedly not affected by the reform. 
While bearing the above in mind, it is clear that decisions by individuals about their working 
patterns are influenced by many factors other than tax, so it is maybe unsurprising that no 
clear trends are observed. 
 
5.5.4 Compliance, administration and simplicity 
 
Supporters of a flat tax e.g. Grecu (2004) claim that its introduction will simplify the tax 
system, leading to improved compliance and reduced administration and compliance costs, all 
of which are linked. Rabushka (in Hall & Rabushka, 1995), one of the HR flat tax creators, 
commented ‘the whole purpose of a flat tax is really to simplify the system and produce a 
more efficient economy’. 
Keen et al (2006) note a few obvious simplifications arising from the flatness income and 
corporation tax rates including reducing incentives to reallocate income, making withholding 
simpler and simplifying income averaging. However, the tax free allowance means that none 
of these problems disappear since there are two marginal rates (the flat rate and zero). PAYE 
would still be problematic for individuals with more than one job to ensure that the tax-free 
allowance is only claimed once. Income averaging is a negligible part of the overall 
complexity burden. 
In Georgia, the tax free allowance was eliminated and Keen et al (2006) note that there is 
some anecdotal evidence that compliance improved following the flat tax reform. However, 
given the substantial structural changes in tax administration at the time of the flat tax reform, 
it is impossible to quantify the effect due solely to flatness. 
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More importantly, it is generally agreed that the rate structure is not the main source of 
complexity in a tax system e.g. Krajcir and Odor (2005). Factors to which complexity can 
largely be attributed include difficulties in defining the tax base due to legislative exemptions 
and special treatments which may be disputed at length between taxpayer and tax authority. 
This issue is discussed in a previous chapter in detail. 
Overall, there is little tangible evidence for the introduction of an EE flat tax leading to tax 
system simplification. Some indirect survey evidence from Ivanova et al (2001) in Russia did 
not suggest that individual taxpayers thought the tax system much simpler post reform. 
 
5.5.4.1 Impact on compliance 
 
Keen et al (2006) note that the model of Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo (1999) suggests linearity 
is theoretically conducive to compliance but the level and structure of tax rates also matter. It 
is widely propagated by flat tax supporters, especially Hall and Rabushka (1995) that cuts in 
tax rates will reduce incentives for evasion, but this is clearly a simplistic view and will 
depend on many factors including the level of costs involved in evasion. 
Research by Slemrod shows that an increase in marginal rate increases the amount of income 
concealed. However, the work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) 
concludes the exact opposite, modelling tax evasion as a gamble and concludes that tax cuts 
increase income and lead to taxpayers investing in more risky assets so evasion actually 
increases. 
Hence, the theoretical impact of tax cuts on compliance is not clear. Moving to a flat tax 
would, for highest earners, reduce evasion under Slemrod (2001) but increase under 
Allingham and Sandmo (1974) and Yitzhaki (1974). This opacity is seen in the conclusion of 
Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) that empirical evidence on the impact of tax on income 
concealment is mixed. 
Again, there is little tangible evidence from the EE flat taxes given the difficulty in measuring 
rates of non-compliance. Some evidence of improved compliance in Russia was found by 
Ivanova et al (2001) by looking at respondents’ consumption rather than income.  
The Slemrod (2001) model would therefore seem the better of the two on the Russian 
evidence – possibly where tax enforcement is weak tax evasion becomes less a gamble than 
an inconvenience. However, the Russian results are complicated by the effect of the 
strengthening of tax administration and anti-corruption political rhetoric, especially of 
President Putin at the time of the reform. 
 
5.5.5 Automatic stabilisation 
 
Keen et al (2006) note that the consensus view is that a flat tax will weaken the automatic 
stabilisers i.e. factors which act to stabilise the national income or workforce without any 
direct government action. However, it is under a flat tax that highest and lowest earners see 
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their marginal tax rates reduced while middle earners see theirs rise, so the overall response is 
unclear. 
Keen et al (2006) show that the level of the tax free allowance is crucial; where it is nil the 
aggregate marginal tax rate falls, as expected on moving to a flat tax, weakening the 
stabilisers. However, the level of the threshold and the income distribution can give results 
that strengthen the stabilisers, so there is no simple answer. 
 
5.5.6 Political motivations 
 
Keen et al (2006) note that political considerations cannot be discounted when investigating 
the reasons for the popularity of flat taxes in Eastern Europe. Most of the reforms were 
introduced by incoming governments starting with Mart Laar in Estonia (1994) and 
continuing through to Mikhail Saakashvili, elected in Georgia after the ‘Rose Revolution’ in 
2004. The combination of a new leader with a populist electoral reform mandate, in 
economies with weak track records of tax compliance where income tax raised relatively little 
revenue, appears fertile ground for introduction of a flat tax to demonstrate internationally a 
move to a market based economy, banishing echoes of a Communist past. 
In certain flat tax countries the reforms accompanying the flat tax also demonstrate a 
government desire to be seen to be firm, as in Russia and Georgia where enforcement was 
increased (the CIA 2006 Factbook states that Georgia ‘suffered from a chronic failure to 
collect tax revenues, however the new government is making progress in reforming the tax 
code, enforcing taxes and cracking down on corruption), and even-handed as in the Slovak 
Republic and Ukraine where the income tax base was greatly broadened across sectors and 
activities. 
Of course, in many cases all sectors and individuals saw a reduction in their average rate of 
tax, i.e. the reform was Pareto-improving3, which would have smoothed its introduction. 
Where a wider package of reforms was introduced, not all groups would have benefited; some 
commentators have highlighted the speed of introduction of the reforms as a factor in their 
successful implementation. 
However, simply because a flat tax is Pareto-improving does not imply that a move towards 
flatness is necessarily sustainable. Modelling work by Bohn and Stuart (2003) showed that 
the winning tax structure will redistribute from upper and lower incomes to middle ones, 
exactly the opposite from that of a typical flat tax. It is a widely held mainstream political 
view that middle income earners are the key to electoral success and this is likely to be a 
significant factor in the apparent rejection of flat taxes by the governments of Western 
Europe. 
It is also noticeable that these flat tax economies saw inequality increase quicker than other 
OECD countries pre-reform. Milanovic (1999) shows that the Gini4 coefficient of the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe rose from 0.25 to 0.35 during the 1990s. Empirical evidence 
shows, counter-intuitively, that more unequal societies redistribute less e.g. Lindert (2000) 
and the ‘Robin Hood paradox’; explanations for such behaviour remain open to debate. 
3 A change in the allocation of resources making at least one person better off without making anyone 
else worse off 
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5.5.7 Other considerations 
 
It should be noted that the EE flat tax reforms apply to personal income tax, not social 
security contributions. In many of the flat tax countries e.g. the Baltic states, these 
contributions are substantially higher than the UK. It is important to realise, therefore, that 
introducing an EE flat tax does not mean that the overall tax burden on individuals is 
necessarily greatly reduced. 
Where the tax base has been significantly changed with the introduction of a flat tax, removal 
of exemptions and deductions increases progressivity, as demonstrated by Peichl (2006) for a 
hypothetical German flat tax. Even when not removed, a flat tax equates the value of such 
allowances for all taxpayers making their effect less regressive, since all taxpayers have the 
same marginal rate. 
Flat tax reforms have often been accompanied by reforms to other taxes to offset revenue 
loss. Such changes have included increasing excise rates or removing VAT exemptions (the 
Slovak Republic fundamentally changed its VAT structure at the same time). As such, the 
distributional impact of the whole tax system needs to be analysed when reviewing the effect 
of EE flat taxes rather than only considering income taxes. Fuel duties increased in several 
cases and may have been progressive as car ownership is higher among the more well off as 
noted by the Slovak Ministry of Finance (2005). However, indirect tax reform is unlikely to 
have increased progressivity as they are by nature regressive taxes. 
Capital income also needs to be considered when analysing flat tax reforms. Certain lower 
income groups could include pensioners living on income from savings who may not benefit 
from the increased tax free allowance as interest income may be taxed by withholding. In 
general, Keen et al (2006) note that wealthy mobile earners have greater opportunity to reduce 
their tax rates so will benefit less from a flat tax than may be predicted. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
While HR and EE flat taxes are very different in format, there is plenty of theoretical analysis 
in the academic field for both. The HR flat tax is dominated by its cash flow, consumption 
base, a truly radical departure from the UK’s current income base. Keen et al’s (2006) 
detailed analysis of EE flat taxes is comprehensive but, although analysing real-life systems, 
many of its conclusions remain untested due to a lack of clear data available from  these 
countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
4 A statistical measure of inequality of a distribution 
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6. Potential simplifying benefits of a flat tax 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter considers the potential simplifying benefits that both HR and EE flat taxes can 
offer the current UK tax legislation and tax system in general. Since compliance costs are so 
closely bound to the overall complexity of a tax system, the effect on these is also considered, 
both on a theoretical basis and using modelling studies from the USA and Western Europe. 
Supporters of flat taxes, both HR and EE varieties, have long held that significant 
simplification of the current UK tax system would occur should their favoured system be 
implemented e.g. Heath (2006). Indeed, even opponents have often implicitly accepted the 
claim, while sometimes questioning the extent of the impact of their introduction e.g. Murphy 
(2006). A typical view of flat tax supporters is that of Davidson (2006), who agrees with 
Mitchell (1998) that ‘two of Mitchell’s benefits are unambiguously correct: a flat tax is 
simple and honest’. The McLeod Report (2001), a study of New Zealand’s tax systems, 
concluded that a proportional income tax (or flat tax) would ‘be simple and resolve several 
complex taxation issues’. 
In addition, HR flat tax proponents such as Armey (1996) routinely claim that compliance 
costs would be should it be introduced, and by implication this can be extended to the UK. 
The claim of its creators Hall and Rabushka that individuals and companies would be able to 
file their tax returns on a postcard-sized form, and the hint that lengthy tax legislation can be 
swept away by a simple law, were important factors in the HR flat tax’s initial appeal.  
Considerable academic work on the simplifying properties of the HR flat tax has been 
performed on this subject in the USA, which has somewhat surprisingly seldom been used in 
the recent European flat tax debates. As discussed above, the EE flat taxes have a common 
property of a flat rate of tax, but are much less radical in design than the HR flat tax.  
 
6.2 Basic simplification 
 
On first principles, a single rate of tax would simplify the calculation of tax liabilities. 
However, as already noted, the chief source of complexity in calculating a liability is defining 
the tax base e.g. Krajcir and Odor (2005), and many UK companies already only include one 
rate in their calculations. Any simplification arising is therefore likely to be modest. 
It has already been noted from work by Keen et al (2006) that the real life EE flat tax systems 
did not introduce any significant simplification solely due to their property of ‘flatness’. This 
was not a surprising observation as simply changing a tax rate is predicted to have little effect 
on the much deeper, inherent complexity seen in real life tax systems. The summary of the 
UK Treasury report (2005) agrees with this viewpoint ‘having a progressive rate schedule 
with a reasonably low number of income brackets is probably not much more complex than 
having a single rate from an administrative point of view’. 
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Feld (1995) identified four features of the then current American tax system (also relevant to 
the UK) which cause statutory or transactional complexity that would be removed by the HR 
flat tax. His first feature applies equally to EE flat taxes where the same flat rate is used for all 
sources of income: 
 
• The single rate removes bracket arbitrage where taxpayers with different marginal rates 
utilise deductions at high rates and include income at low rate 
 
This feature would include prevention of arbitraging between the tax treatments of businesses 
and individuals since the HR single rate applies for both sources of income. Individuals are 
likely to prefer to be paid as wages from their own business under the HR flat tax so they can 
take advantage of the personal allowance. To some extent, therefore, such arbitraging will 
continue in the taxation affairs of individuals. 
This simplifying feature could also remove the rate differential between capital and income, 
removing the inspiration behind many current tax avoidance schemes. As a result, certain 
anti-avoidance legislation may no longer be necessary. This scenario is especially relevant for 
EE flat taxes, as capital gains are not taxed under an HR flat tax. 
 
 
Feld’s (1995) other features are: 
 
• Current expensing of investment removes the rules over depreciation and basis 
 
This feature only applies to the HR flat tax. under its provisions, the complex UK capital 
allowances legislation would be removed since immediate tax relief would be available for 
capital expenditure on business assets. 
 
• Removal of the capital gain/income distinction removes the need to designate transactions 
under the more favourable category 
 
As noted above, this would apply to both HR and EE flat taxes and remove the need for 
associated anti-avoidance legislation. 
 
• Accounting on a cash basis removes arbitrage between different accounting systems 
 
This feature only applies to the HR flat tax. 
 
However, it must be noted that the obvious simplifying factors and associated compliance 
cost reductions may be qualified in practice. For example, the expensing of investments gives 
rise to a large number of tax planning opportunities as identified in the next chapter. These 
would be likely to require complex anti-avoidance legislation to be passed by government to 
prevent unacceptable revenue loss. Benefits arising from cash accounting are also qualified 
since the use of accrual accounting in preparing statutory accounts is now firmly accepted 
practice in the UK. Adjustments would therefore need to be made to a cash flow basis for tax 
purposes, creating compliance costs for taxpayers. 
All of these factors should in theory lead to increased clarity in the UK tax system and 
remove sources of tax avoidance planning to exploit the current system. Significant amounts 
of anti-avoidance planning, and hence blocking legislation, are concerned with the often 
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artificial differences between capital and income. In addition, the complicated capital 
allowances legislation would be removed, providing genuine simplification and compliance 
cost savings. However, as noted above, any such simplification may well be counterbalanced 
by increased complexity in other areas.  
 
6.3 Tax base simplification 
 
Aside from Feld’s (1995) points above, the most important area where flat taxes could offer 
some simplification and associated reductions in compliance costs is in the simplification of 
the UK’s current corporation tax base. 
The HR flat tax should serve to simplify the tax base by removing a number of deductions 
and exemptions, meaning that taxable profit can be calculated with fewer adjustments from 
accounting profit, reducing compliance costs for business. EE flat taxes do not have any 
intrinsic base-simplifying properties, but the flattening of tax rates has often in practice been 
accompanies by simplification of the tax base e.g. the Slovak Republic’s reforms.  
The Tax Reform Commission in the UK published a report in 2007 entitled ‘Tax Matters: 
Reforming the Tax System’. Introduction of a flat tax of the EE variety in the UK was 
considered, largely drawing on the work of Heath (2006). The Commission concluded that a 
flat tax could simplify the tax system since with fewer taxes and exemptions it would be 
simpler and cheaper to administer. This would possibly have the beneficial effect of bringing 
transactions out of the ‘grey’ economy, leading to an increase in tax revenue. 
In a similar vein from the USA, the GAO (1998) noted that consumption-based taxes such as 
the HR flat tax may remove some difficulties in defining and recognising taxable income of 
the current system, thus reducing both compliance and administrative costs.  
Teather (2005) notes that the removal of allowances and deductions is practical under a 
generic flat tax system because they become less important with a single, low rate of tax. He 
also notes that the single rate in the flat tax is itself a source of simplicity, which is commonly 
extended by removal of allowances and deductions from the system. The Slovak flat tax 
reforms (Krajcir and Odor, 2005) were notable among the EE flat taxes for the removal of 
multiple exemptions from the country’s tax legislation, a reform considered to have had a 
significant impact on reducing complexity in the tax system. 
The Tax Reform Commission (2007) report highlights the point from a UK perspective that 
‘some of the benefits of simplicity attributed to flat rate taxes arise from proposed changes in 
what sources of income are included in the tax base rather than from replacement of a 
multiple tax rate system with a single tax rate’, suggesting that base simplification is the more 
important effect of the system. 
 
6.4 Potential reduction in UK compliance costs 
 
While the promise of simplification of a tax system by supporters of flat tax is attractive, the 
prospect of associated substantial reductions on compliance costs is of immense interest to 
business taxpayers. One of the well known claims of the HR flat tax made by its founders 
Hall and Rabushka is that tax returns can be made on a postcard-sized form due to the 
extreme simplicity of calculating tax liabilities.  
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The GAO report (1998) summarises a number of potential impacts on tax compliance for 
American business on the introduction of the HR flat tax; at first glance, a modest reduction 
in compliance costs appears to be the predicted outcome. 
 
Burden Under current system Impact of HR flat tax 
Return filing All businesses file  All businesses included 
Records kept Records supporting income 
and expenses supposed to be 
kept 
Businesses responsible for 
wage reporting to 
individuals; records for items 
such as depreciation not 
needed except for possible 
transition 
Calculations made Complicated provisions 
included for provisions such 
as depreciation 
Fewer calculations such as 
for depreciation and multiple 
rates required; possible fringe 
benefit calculations 
Complexity faced Detailed rules involved; 
complexity reflected in areas 
such as depreciation; 
difficulties existing in 
defining and recognising 
income 
Without exemptions and 
multiple rates, tax simplified; 
fringe benefits calculations 
complicated, if broad range 
taxed at individual level 
Requirement to furnish 
information returns 
Several information and 
withholding documents filed 
Returns still needed for 
wages but not investment 
earning; withholding 
possibly still required 
Impact on Tax Compliance for US business on introduction of the HR flat tax (GAO 1998, p163) 
 
6.4.1 Processing returns 
 
Under an HR flat tax, businesses would continue to file returns so the number processed 
might be similar compared to the current UK tax system. Dates of filing and payment of taxes 
are not specifically mentioned in the original HR flat tax plan. The GAO report (1998) claims 
that the return form would be much simpler which would ‘facilitate automation of data entry 
and document matching, making the process less error-prone and costly and providing timely 
data for auditors’.  
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6.5 Compliance costs studies 
 
6.5.1 HR flat tax studies 
 
Studies which attempt to estimate the effect on compliance costs with the introduction of the 
HR flat tax have been carried out, among others, by both Slemrod (1996) and Hall (1996) in 
the USA. 
An aggressive proponent of the benefits of the HR flat tax, Hall (1996) claimed that its 
introduction would cut the cost of compliance by 94% if introduced in its pure form. He notes 
that a cash flow tax such as the HR flat tax would remove the complexities associated with 
the following items, which he claims contribute the most to compliance costs, noting that the 
Tax Foundation in the USA found that 45.5% of the income tax compliance costs spent by the 
Fortune 500 companies relate to foreign source income: 
 
• Depreciation and capital allowances 
• Foreign source income rules 
• Inventory capitalisation 
• Amortisation of intangibles 
• Long term contracts 
 
 
Hall (1996) comments that the HR flat tax would, in his opinion, remove almost every area of 
complexity identified in the Tax Foundation sponsored survey of senior corporate tax officers 
investigating complex areas in the current tax code. 
In terms of actual numbers, ignoring transition costs and potential costs of reintroducing 
social policy (both of which are potentially significant), Hall (1996) estimated the cost of 
record keeping, learning the new laws, preparing and sending the tax forms would cost $8.4 
billion. Businesses (both incorporated and unincorporated) would take three hours and 
twenty-four minutes annually to comply with the HR flat tax compared to over two hundred 
hours for the average company under the current system. The reduction is achieved in all 
aspects of the paperwork burden. The compliance burden of the pure HR flat tax was 
estimated using the same methods that the IRS used to calculate the current system’s 
compliance costs, which estimate taxpayer paperwork burdens using the various 
characteristics of the tax return forms and the content of the instructions. 
However, it should be noted that the accuracy of these calculations has been questioned. Gale 
(2001) describes some of the figures for time estimates as ‘implausibly low’ and points out 
the absence of many compliance costs such as tax planning and auditing. 
Slemrod’s (1996) study makes the more realistic conclusion ‘it is impossible to confidently 
forecast the collection cost of the business part of the flat tax on the basis of observable 
systems, because none exists’. He makes an educated guess that business compliance costs 
would be cut by one third (from $17 billion individual income tax and $20 billion corporation 
tax) to about $25 billion. Individual filing costs would reduce by 70% from $33 billion to $10 
billion giving total compliance costs of $35 billion, which is half his compliance cost estimate 
for income tax at 0.5% of GDP in 1995. Such calculations still imply a considerable saving in 
compliance costs is achievable 
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6.5.2 Western European modelling 
 
Compliance costs have also been modelled in Western Europe following interest generated 
from the EE flat tax reforms; these consider a tax system resembling EE rather than HR flat 
tax. 
Fuest et al (2007) state in their flat tax simulation for Germany that ‘flat tax reforms are 
thought to reduce administration and compliance costs’ and quote Fuest et al (2006), whose 
study for Germany showed that revenue neutral simplification of the tax base can reduce 
compliance costs by about 8%. 
Fuest et al (2006) consider whether tax simplification leads to efficiency in an empirical 
analysis for Germany. They point out the importance attributed to simplification in debates on 
tax reform but note that little empirical research exists. In their opinion, this is in part due to 
the fact that ‘tax simplification itself is not a clearly defined concept’, and hence changes in 
tax law may not clearly increase or decrease the complexity of the system. Broadening the tax 
base is usually considered to be a simplification, but Slemrod (1984) gives a case of imputing 
rent to owner-occupied housing as an example where complexity increases on base 
broadening. 
The group takes the use of professional tax advice as an indicator of the complexity of the tax 
system and its associated compliance costs. Tax simplification is modelled as abolition of a 
set of deductions from the tax base, a feature of both HR and EE flat taxes. While the study 
relates to personal income tax it applies equally to corporate income tax. Unsurprisingly, 
perhaps, simplification leads to a modest reduction in tax advice. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
On a superficial level, flat taxes appear to be able to offer some significant simplifications for 
the current UK system. Broadening of the tax base ad removal of bracket arbitrage are 
benefits offered by both EE and HR flat taxes. The HR flat tax offers further simplification in 
the removal of capital/income distinctions and expensing of business assets. 
However, the extent of simplification appears to be overstated by flat tax supporters. 
Weisbach (2000) concludes on this issue ‘the claims of simplicity by proponents of the flat 
tax are wildly overstated. Overall, one should expect a system that is simpler than current law, 
but not extremely so’. Compliance cost studies such as those of Hall (1996) and Slemrod 
(1996) would therefore appear to paint a false picture of the benefits of an HR flat tax. In 
addition, introduction of a flat tax would generate new forms of compliance and further 
compliance costs of unknown magnitude but which cannot be overlooked. 
 
Slemrod (1996) notes that any comprehensive tax system will have inherent structural 
complexity with difficult issues such as the capital and income distinction. Consumption 
based taxes such as the HR flat tax have some simplifying features such as exempting 
ordinary return on capital. In addition, they avoid problems of measurement and transactional 
complexity when different ways of taxing capital are not taxed in the same way. Any 
simplicity gains depend, though, on the implementation of the system, and whether the pure 
HR flat tax is practical to introduce. 
 63
  Potential simplifying benefits of a flat tax 
Slemrod (1996) also questions whether a consumption basis is needed for major 
simplification of the existing tax system. He considers that a ‘clean-base, return-free income 
tax system with a single rate’ would achieve much, but capital income taxation complexities 
remain. An HR flat tax on the surface provides major simplification but the implicit subsidies 
for certain behaviour are possibly the biggest barrier to true simplification.  
Should the simplification claims of the HR flat tax prove to be significantly overstated, 
Weisbach (2000) warns ‘Without the claim of simplicity, and with the claims of efficiency 
correspondingly reduced, the case for the flat tax becomes extremely weak’. The next chapter 
introduces a range of arguments as to why significant simplification is unlikely. 
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7. Evidence that a flat tax would not reduce complexity of the 
UK tax system 
 
Despite some apparently simplifying features of flat tax noted above, there is substantial 
evidence that the overall effect on the UK’s corporation tax legislation and compliance costs 
may in fact be very limited.  
One of the first studies in this area was made by Feld in 1995 in the early days of the 
discussion of the HR flat tax. This was quickly followed by a number of commentators in the 
USA such as Calegari (1998), who identified new tax avoidance opportunities arising under 
the HR flat tax not in the current system, as well as cases where the HR flat tax removes 
barriers to avoidance constructed by the tax authorities. These would require legislation to 
block and would thereby increase the complexity of the tax legislation and the time needed to 
comply with it. 
The majority of this chapter refers to the HR flat tax given the claims made over its 
simplifying powers and cost savings as detailed in the previous chapter. The EE flat taxes and 
the effects of their introduction are considered in the next chapter. 
 
7.1 Effect on legislative complexity 
 
Martin (2005) considered the effect of introducing an EE flat tax in upon the UK tax 
legislation. He agreed that such a flat tax would remove many of the reliefs that cause 
legislative complexity and broaden the tax base. However, he points out that abolishing all of 
the reliefs noted by Teather (2005) would be likely to repeal only 1% or 2% of current direct 
tax law, doing little to remove complexity generated by length. 
Martin (2005) concludes that ‘simplification of the tax system is ultimately a matter of 
political will and conviction. An attractive panacea – such as the flat tax – will not in itself 
solve the problem of complexity’. He notes that supporters of flat taxes and their potential for 
simplifying the UK tax system should beware of the danger identified by Mencken (1920) 
‘for every complex problem, there is a solution that is simple, neat and wrong’, with sources 
of complexity remaining and new sources created. 
 
7.2 New opportunities for tax avoidance planning 
 
A number of studies suggest that it appears likely that the HR flat tax legislation will simply 
provide different opportunities from the current system for tax avoidance. These are likely to 
be sought out quickly and exploited by tax advisers and taxpayers. Government will then have 
to act to block the unintended loopholes with new anti-avoidance legislation, and there is no 
reason to think that these will be any simpler and create less complexity than the current 
regime. 
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Feld (1995) concludes that to avoid revenue loss, the HR flat tax will either generate complex 
business transactions (to skirt the simple rules) or complicated tax laws (to reduce the gaming 
possibilities) or both. 
Bankman and Schler (2005) note the possibility that tax professionals may leave the field 
when faced with a simple tax code in which is harder to find loopholes. However, they feel 
that this is unlikely to happen due to the potential rewards at stake, and a great deal of effort 
by the tax avoidance industry is likely to be expended. The fact that even professionals cannot 
forecast the next legislative loophole, and hence avoidance opportunities in tax law, means it 
may be almost impossible to predict the effect of introducing a flat tax. 
7.2.1 Openness of the HR flat tax 
 
Weisbach (2000) identifies the unusual feature of ‘openness’ of the HR flat tax as the key 
reason for new opportunities for tax avoidance planning. Openness means that businesses can 
claim tax deductions for transactions that are not necessarily matched by being taxed 
elsewhere. An example is the sale of land by an individual to a business; under the HR flat 
tax, the individual is not taxed but the business can claim an immediate tax deduction for the 
purchase price. This openness comes from the lack of a requirement for invoices for domestic 
transactions, and the territorial treatment of international transactions. 
Credit invoice VAT systems, which bear some resemblance to the HR flat tax, are usually 
closed systems, as is the current UK corporation tax system. This means that the above 
scenario will not occur, with any transaction being treated symmetrically for tax purposes. 
Where such symmetry breaks down, it will be exploited by tax avoiders and usually require 
new legislation to close the loophole.  
 
7.2.2 International operation of the HR flat tax 
 
The HR flat tax taxes exports and exempts imports whereas other VATs do the exact 
opposite. This makes the flat tax internationally open. 
 
7.2.3.1 Background 
 
The HR flat tax is territorial as it does not tax foreign income, unlike the current UK tax 
system. It is an origin based tax since the taxpayer gets a deduction for imports and pays tax 
on exports. Since other countries have destination based taxes, the flat tax will doubly tax 
exports and not tax imports in any country that introduced it, which would not be a politically 
popular result. 
Economists may argue that exchange rates would adjust automatically to remove this 
distortion with the currency of the flat tax state weakening. However, these arguments would 
be likely to face political opposition since a double tax is an obvious and immediate result, 
unlike a currency adjustment.  
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7.2.3.2 Origin base 
 
Weisbach (2000) is not clear why the HR flat tax is designed to be origin based, considering 
that Hall and Rabushka deliberately refer to the HR flat tax as an income tax for political 
reasons. He comments ‘The question is whether this cosmetic difference is worth the 
disadvantages: being inconsistent with other consumption taxes, relying on currency 
adjustments to avoid adverse effects on US exports and being open internationally’.  
 
7.3 Tax avoidance planning strategies 
 
7.3.1 Introduction 
 
Stiglitz (1985) put forward three general principles which may form the basis of successful 
tax avoidance planning: 
 
• Postponing taxes into future periods 
• Arbitrage across different income streams with different tax treatment (source-based)  
• Arbitrage across different tax rates (rate-based) 
 
In a similar vein, Scholes and Wolfson (1992) state that effective tax planning requires three 
main considerations: 
 
• Tax implications of a transaction to all parties 
• Explicit and implicit taxes and tax clienteles 
• Costs of implementation 
 
Scholes and Wolfson (1988) show that tax avoidance strategies can incur significant non-tax 
costs. For example, under an HR flat tax, postponing tax liabilities by borrowing to purchase 
equipment may lock into unfavourable investments that are costly to reverse. In addition, 
Stiglitz (1985) notes that tax avoidance effects cannot be analysed by considering a single 
taxpayer, since another taxpayer’s liability may have increased.  
 
7.4 Strategies 
 
Weisbach (2000) considers five key areas that form the basis of much current tax planning 
and are hence responsible for complexity of tax law. All of these areas will present new 
opportunities for tax avoidance planning under the HR flat tax, and are discussed in greater 
depth below: 
 
• Accounting methods 
• Financial transactions 
• Losses and structure of the business tax 
• International transactions 
• Small businesses 
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7.4.1 Accounting methods 
 
The HR flat tax uses a cash flow basis to determine taxable profit. This goes against recent 
accounting developments in the UK which require accounts to be prepared on an accruals 
basis. Accounts prepared on a cash accounting basis can easily be distorted by delaying or 
bringing forward payments close to the year end, both of which would directly impact the 
taxpayer’s liabilities. 
 
7.4.1.1 Accounting methods and periods 
 
Weisbach (2000) notes that some commentators have argued that the fact that the timing of a 
transaction is determined by the date of payment is the principle argument in favour of a 
consumption tax over an income tax. Complexity generated by rules of timing under accruals-
based accounting is thus removed. However, this property can easily be manipulated as 
mentioned above by transactions close to the period end, as discussed below.  
 
7.4.1.2 Postponing recognition of sales income 
 
Postponement of taxes is easy in a cash flow based tax, since sales income arising in the 
current year can be delayed being received until the next year, either by collusion with the 
customer or delay in issuing a sales invoice, leading to postponement of tax payment for one 
year. In a growing business, this represents effective permanent deferral of tax. Under 
accruals accounting, such planning is ineffective. 
Calegari (1998) points out that the HR flat tax does not contain any guidance on allowed tax 
accounting periods, as noted in other studies such as Feld (1995). Since this presents an easy 
opportunity to avoid taxes, such as by paying connected companies with different year ends, 
he assumes that all taxpayers would have to use the same year end. 
The scheme does have some practical difficulties. The plan may depend on the customer 
agreeing to the payment pattern and a taxpayer business will be unlikely to do so as they will 
not obtain a deduction until payment is physically made. There may also be some cash flow 
risks. Companies with losses may be prepared to defer payment, but transaction costs and the 
HR interest adjustment to carried forward losses may be an issue. There is also the potential 
to defer income by instalment sales. 
Commentators are split on whether the ability to defer income is a serious issue. Bankman 
(2005) does not believe that the present value of the tax liability for the company will alter 
whereas Schler (2005) highlights the immediate drop in revenue for government as a serious 
issue in the short term. 
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7.4.1.3 Accelerating purchases 
 
Since purchases are deducted from income to arrive at taxable profit, accelerating them will 
serve to reduce the business’s tax liability for the period and give a cash flow benefit. This is 
the converse of the above strategy and again requires the agreement of the other party in the 
transaction. To obtain such agreement, implicit taxes in the shape of higher purchase prices 
are likely to become a factor, potentially negating the strategy. The HR flat tax is not clear as 
to whether assets purchased under an instalment plan receive an immediate deduction for the 
full cost. 
The HR flat tax does provide an incentive to purchase assets from non-business sources e.g. 
land used for personal or investment purposes where the seller recognises no income. Where 
the seller is an exempt organisation or a retirement plan this strategy will also work. Business 
owners can therefore effectively shelter income using investments. This tax planning idea is 
discussed at length below. 
 
7.4.2 Financial transactions 
 
7.4.2.1 Reclassification of income 
 
The HR flat tax is vulnerable to source-based arbitrage planning due to its openness, because 
several sources of income are exempt from tax under its provisions. Examples of exempt 
income include investment or personal use income, so there would be an obvious incentive to 
convert business income into one of these categories. It should, however, always be borne in 
mind that, where the costs of identifying an appropriate counterparty and negotiating exceed 
the tax saving, the strategy is not worth pursuing. 
 The HR flat tax will certainly need new rules to deal with financial instruments as opposed to 
usual goods and services. The current UK tax system has complex rules to distinguish 
financial returns and disguised interest. However, the HR flat tax’s rules would probably need 
to be more comprehensive given the difference in tax treatment at stake.  
A number of examples of such reclassification schemes are discussed below: 
 
7.4.2.2 Conversion of sales to interest income 
 
Under the HR flat tax, interest income is exempt whereas income from sales of goods and 
services is taxable. Both are taxable under the existing UK system. This gives a clear 
incentive for companies to designate income as interest, which can easily be achieved using 
complex financial instruments or by more straightforward planning. 
Sales income may be converted to interest income by offering the buyer a lower sales price in 
return for a high rate of interest on an instalment paid in a later tax year. However, the success 
of this planning depends on the other party to the transaction. A business customer who is 
independent of the seller is unlikely to agree as they will lose the benefit of a full deduction 
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for tax. However, an individual is more likely to agree as the purchase has no tax 
consequences for them. Anti-avoidance solutions such as legislating maximum rates of 
interest would be complex. 
 
7.4.2.3 Converting interest payments to purchase of goods 
 
Under the HR flat tax, purchases of goods and capital assets are deductible for a business, but 
interest payable is not. Both are deductible under the current UK system. Again, tax planning 
to reclassify interest payments as purchases would be an attractive option. 
One simple scheme is the converse of the above where businesses can purchase assets from 
individuals and pay above market value during the next accounting year, effectively taking a 
loan without having to account for interest. The financial return is thus shifted to the exempt 
individual, a consequence of the openness of the flat tax.  
 
7.4.2.4 Asset expensing 
 
Under the HR flat tax, a company’s liabilities can be offset by buying any asset which 
receives an immediate tax deduction. It does not have to be used in the business. Such an 
opportunity of perfectly legal avoidance is likely to be unacceptable to revenue authorities. 
The HR flat tax treats rental income from a property or land investment as a business activity. 
Feld (1995) gives the example of a business owner buying a field let out for nominal income 
and being able to deduct the purchase price of the field in full against other business income. 
Under current UK law no deduction would be available since the field is classed as an 
investment asset. 
There is disagreement between commentators as to the seriousness of this issue, loosely split 
between economists and tax advisers. Economists such as Bankman (in a joint paper with 
Schler below, 2005) do not view this as a problem since the total liability remains unchanged 
although its present value will reduce. The risk of tax rates decreasing would be balanced by 
the risk of them increasing meaning, among other factors, that deferral would not be the 
automatic option for companies. Tax advisers such as Schler (2005), however, feel that 
deferral is a fundamental flaw and reason enough to reject the HR flat tax on its own. A single 
avoidance scheme that achieves its purpose could remove all accumulated tax liabilities of a 
company and the temptation to do so would be too great for most businesses. In his opinion, 
government revenues would be likely to suffer seriously both in the short and longer terms. 
 
7.4.3 Loss planning 
 
Company losses have traditionally been an area of extensive tax planning in the UK to reduce 
liabilities and much anti-avoidance legislation has been written in this field such as that to 
stop companies buying others solely to utilise their tax losses. Similar provisions do not seem 
to exist under the HR flat tax and again it is likely that complex rules would need to be 
introduced. Feld (1995) comments from a USA perspective ‘the logical conclusion of 
unregulated allocation of deductions would allow free transferability of losses. Historically, 
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however, the outcry against the opportunity by wealthy businesses to purchase exemption 
from income tax has produced the existing restrictions on the transfer of loss corporations and 
repeal in 1982 of the finance lease provisions of the 1981 tax act’. 
 
7.4.3.1 Refundability 
 
Rules covering losses and business transactions such as formation, liquidation and mergers 
are closely linked. Under the HR flat tax, no refund for losses is allowed (unlike VATs). This 
is likely to be due to the openness of the system and lack of invoices meaning fraudulent 
inclusion of losses where no corresponding gain is recorded becomes likely. The various 
fraudulent missing trader VAT schemes in the UK testify to the attractiveness of such 
schemes. 
Under the HR flat tax, losses are carried forward with a rate below that of the market, 
presumably as a compromise measure. In practice, complications would arise if the rate of 
interest changed in calculating the amount of losses to carry forward and rules governing 
order of loss offset may also be required. 
Weisbach (2000) notes that some commentators have argued that carrying forward losses 
under the HR flat tax would not be a good idea since enforcing loss restrictions under the tax 
would be costly and difficult. A refundable scheme has been proposed; however, this would 
seem impractical when combined with the ability to deduct non-business asset costs 
immediately from profits and obtain cash from the government. Fraud and elaborate tax 
planning to create artificial losses would be certain to be problematic. 
Since losses are not refundable, tax effects arise on transactions between businesses. This 
could lead to non-arm’s length pricing to avoid cash flow disadvantages, and appropriate anti-
avoidance legislation would need to be introduced. 
 
7.4.3.2 Transferability 
 
Losses are easily transferred under the HR flat tax between parties acting in concert to 
manipulate transfer prices.  
Martin (2005) has identified that some form of group relief will be likely to be required, even 
though the HR flat tax makes no provision for loss transferability. Similar rules to those 
restricting the use of losses after a change in ownership might also need to be introduced if 
the non-transferability provisions were relaxed, adding further complexity. 
As Weisbach (2000) says, ‘effectively, much of current law ends up being recreated in the flat 
tax’. 
 
7.4.4 International transactions 
 
The HR flat tax would change the current UK system of taxing a company’s worldwide 
income, with credit for foreign taxes and other rules under the double tax treaties. Goods and 
services exported from the UK would be included in receipts, business inputs imported into 
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the UK would be deducted but income from activities abroad would be excluded from the tax 
base. 
This provision would give wide scope for tax avoidance by companies able to move 
transactions overseas. The UK currently taxes a company’s worldwide income where the 
company is UK resident or centrally managed and controlled in the UK. It is likely that 
complicated transfer pricing legislation would be required to prevent substantial erosion of 
the tax base. 
Under the HR flat tax, overseas earnings of businesses would not be taxed. Hall and 
Rabushka considered that international business would be attracted to the US due to their low 
rate of 19% which would counter the initial loss of revenue. As already noted, some 
simplification would result under the HR flat tax with problems administering foreign tax 
credits being removed. However, the future of double tax treaties under the HR flat tax is 
unclear and other countries might change their own international tax rules in response. 
 
7.4.4.1 Transfer pricing 
 
Under the HR flat tax, for the reasons noted above, interest income would ideally be moved 
into the flat tax country where it would be untaxed, and interest expense moved abroad where 
it would get a tax deduction. A low rate of HR flat tax might encourage companies to locate 
more activity in the flat tax country; this could then lead to double tax treaties being 
renegotiated requiring legislative changes under the flat tax (Hines 1996). Transfer pricing 
legislation would be required to prevent these abuses, but the international scale of business 
for larger companies would still serve to make this a difficult area to administer. The HR flat 
tax is therefore likely to need rules similar in scope and complexity to current rules.  
 
7.4.4.2 Treaties 
 
Avi-Yonah (1995) suggests that renegotiation of all treaties would be required as the HR flat 
tax would not qualify currently as an income tax, and as it removes withholding tax on 
dividends, the chief negotiating tool, this could be a major and costly exercise. Weisbach 
(2000) disagrees, noting that, although the flat tax is not an income tax, in periods before 
where tax on capital was zero due to enhanced depreciation and investment credits, there was 
no renegotiation necessary. He does concede, however, that in practice withholding may need 
to be retained as leverage against renegotiation. 
 
7.5 Potential complicating reforms required on introduction 
 
7.5.1 Political pressure 
 
Feld (1995) identifies some companies who would lose out under an HR flat tax and would be 
likely to lobby for the current system to be retained: 
 
• Companies benefiting from special deductions 
 72
                               Evidence that a flat tax would not reduce complexity of the UK tax system 
• Labour-intensive companies – companies that rely on machinery rather than labour would 
benefit from full expensing of plant and machinery whereas labour reliant companies 
would be unable to deduct employer’s national insurance and other fringe benefits 
• Home builders – in the US where mortgage interest is tax deductible for individuals the 
HR flat tax might be expected to lower house prices since it abolishes this relief – this 
could affect UK companies with US operations 
 
 
Opposition might also come from those unsure about the future unknown consequences of 
such a major change of tax systems and those philosophically opposed to such as shifting of 
the tax burden. 
Some companies would face massive increases in their tax liabilities. Hall and Rabushka 
(1995) note that General Motors’ liability would rise from $110 million in 1993 to $2.7 
billion under a 19% HR flat tax. Despite economic theory on the incidence of corporation tax 
mentioned in a previous chapter that individuals rather than companies ultimately bear the 
tax, companies’ management are unlikely to accept such a change without protest, possibly 
demanding extra relief or a smaller tax base. 
Other companies with large profits would pay no taxes upon introduction of an HR flat tax. 
Income from financial assets such as interest is not taxable under the HR flat tax; although 
this is consistent with the flat tax theory, this situation in the past led to anti-avoidance 
legislation. On the other hand, companies with losses may have large liabilities, especially 
those with large interest payments, health insurance, payroll taxes and state and local income 
taxes (a particular problem in the US), none of which would be deductible. Gale (2001) 
comments that such companies would likely press to retain deductions for these items which 
could account for half the business tax base. 
Truman (2008) highlights the difficulty for government in passing simplifying legislation 
where an increase in liability was the result ‘it was no surprise that the main attempt in the 
[2008] Budget to genuinely simplify an area of tax, taking CGT back to its roots, came under 
withering fire, which forced at least a partial retreat’. The results of this recent tax reform are 
discussed in a later chapter. 
Moving to a HR flat tax would entail a radical change to the current system and could give 
rise to perception issues for companies, potentially leading to opposition. Possibly the greatest 
issue would be the change from an accruals to a cash flow basis and the company’s profit in 
its accounts would not form even the starting point for taxable profits. Changing the logic and 
structure of corporation tax will create perceived problems even though they make theoretical 
sense under the HR flat tax model. 
 
7.5.2 Transition tax  
 
Introducing a HR flat tax without any transition measures would remove existing tax bases 
with no more deductions for amortisation, equivalent to a lump sum tax on existing capital. 
There is no mention of transition relief in the HR flat tax. While this would raise political and 
economic problems, some form of relief might be the simplest solution.  
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Some economists including Bankman (2005) think that not introducing transition relief is 
efficient, since no distorting factors for spending that capital arise, and equitable since taxing 
existing capital is progressive. Others such as Schler (2005) argue that it is inefficient, since 
taxpayers will change behaviour to avoid paying the tax, and inequitable as it is applied to 
consumption on after tax savings. However, political pressure is likely to produce a form of 
transition relief. On a practical level, were a HR flat tax to be implemented, Pearlman (1996) 
notes ‘we should expect near unanimity that it will be necessary to provide transition relief’.  
Zodrow (2000) agrees that relief is ‘virtually inevitable’. Both discuss areas that would 
require relief including lost capital allowances, losses brought forward and foreign tax credits. 
The radical change in the tax treatment of interest would also be a candidate. On a more 
general note, transition to a new tax system could affect existing legal contracts. Pearlman 
(1996) concludes ‘inevitably, any approach will make the new law more complex for a long 
time’. 
There would still be opportunities for taxpayers to avoid transition tax and the necessary anti-
avoidance rules would be complex. Taxpayers would attempt to recover existing basis, for 
example by selling assets to non-taxpayers prior to transition and then leasing back or 
purchasing after transition. Shifting assets between group companies is likely to occur, again 
leading to necessary anti-avoidance measures, complicating the existing tax legislation. Rules 
to prevent this may not be successful; a retrospective date to eliminate basis would be simple 
but unpopular, and anti-avoidance provisions for leases would be very complicated. Long 
term contracts, including financial instruments, may be significantly dislocated. 
Transition relief would reduce these problems but still complicate the legislation. A dual 
system would exist which would probably be more complex and expensive to maintain than 
the present law. 
 
7.6 Impact on compliance and administration costs 
 
7.6.1 Information reporting and filing frequency 
 
Under the HR flat tax, businesses would still need to keep accounting records. Businesses 
would continue to submit records to employees and HMRC showing employees’ wages and 
salaries. Calculation of capital allowances would be eliminated, as would foreign tax credits, 
investment income and foreign income records, unless a transition period were introduced. 
Businesses would probably file similar returns and make similar payments to the existing 
systems, although Calegari (1998) notes that there is no mention of due dates for returns or 
payment of tax for companies in the HR proposal. 
There is no reliable data to evaluate the compliance cost of a HR flat tax, given that no such 
tax system has been implemented in practice. As mentioned previously, Slemrod (1996) 
estimated overall compliance costs as half his estimate for the current US system with 
business costs cut by one third, although Gravelle (1996) points out that his compliance 
figures, although reasonable from the data available, are based on weak data, difficulty in 
identifying marginal costs and exaggeration. 
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7.6.2 Impact on tax administrators 
 
The GAO (1998) produced the following table comparing the administration requirements of 
the then current US tax system compared with the HR flat tax. Although the results are only 
qualitative, they do highlight that significant administration costs reduction is an unlikely 
outcome. 
 
Item Current tax HR flat tax 
Impact on number of returns 
processed 
Millions of returns and other 
material received 
Returns simplified; although 
similar number less 
information required as 
interest and dividends not 
taxed 
Impact on refund processing Millions of refunds issued Refunds still required for 
excess payments 
Impact on examination 
approach 
Tax returns matched with 
information returns 
Auditing business records 
still needed 
Continuation of old 
compliance problems 
Compliance problems 
relating to income definition, 
unreported income and more 
specific issues such as 
transfer pricing, depreciation, 
deductibility of business 
expenses, small businesses, 
contractors and the 
underground economy 
Problems will mainly 
continue 
Resolution of old compliance 
problems 
Not applicable Compliance problems with 
depreciation and income 
definition eliminated 
Creation of new compliance 
problems 
Not applicable Tax avoidance encouraged 
for employees paid other 
than by cash; sales 
characterised as interest 
received and fringe benefits 
audit could be complicated 
Impact on collections from 
tax delinquents 
Many investigations and 
accounts disposed of 
Collection follow up reduced 
by less information; 
employment tax problems 
likely to continue 
Impact on individuals’ 
questions received 
Many taxpayer queries 
received 
Some questions unnecessary 
when income and deduction 
items eliminated 
Comparison of administration requirements of US tax system with HR flat tax (GAO, 1998, p167) 
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7.6.3 Audit & examination 
 
Examining business records would still take up much of HMRC’s time under an HR flat tax. 
The GAO (1998) report points out that tax authorities would have to create a new risk system 
to identify returns of interest; given that no HR flat tax has been implemented this would have 
to be based on the current system and would take time to develop. 
Current problem areas of compliance would remain under the HR flat tax such as 
understatement of income, and the underground economy would also be likely to remain. 
Grubert and Newlon (1995) have noted that abusive5 transfer pricing would remain, 
especially given the opportunities for avoidance under the HR flat tax discussed above. 
 
7.6.4 Taxpayer services 
 
The GAO report (1998) acknowledges the need for an initial education period given the scale 
of changing to an HR flat tax, which would lead to several one-off costs. The business tax 
would require initial extra audit time by HMRC to ensure compliance with the new system. 
Major changes such as capital expensing would need significant time to explain to taxpayers, 
and if a transition system was operated, complying with two systems would likely require 
more expenditure on education and services for taxpayers.  
 
7.6.5 Impact on compliance costs 
 
Calegari (1998) suggests business will incur significant costs restructuring to avoid tax on 
introduction of a HR flat tax. He also considers that compliance and enforcement costs will be 
lower under a HR flat tax but that the authorities will have to conduct extra audits for 
business, increasing administration costs. 
Gravelle (1996) analyses likely effects on compliance costs by breaking down the 
introduction of a HR flat tax into five stages: 
 
• A general base broadening  
• Imposition of single-level tax of capital income 
• Adoption of a territorial base eliminating foreign tax credits 
• Adoption of a single flat rate with exemption for individuals 
• Shift of the tax base from income to consumption by allowing expensing 
 
 
 
 
5 Manipulation of transfer prices so that they no longer reflect economic reality in order to reduce tax 
liabilities 
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Looking at the stages in detail, Gravelle (1996) comments that in the final stage compliance 
issues are of low importance since businesses will still require books of accounts, even under 
an expensing regime. Transition issues will be far more significant with a potential lump sum 
tax on old capital, and the complexity of potential transition legislation. The fourth step leads 
to a similar conclusion since most taxpayers already have an effective flat rate with an 
exemption. 
The territorial base is important for large firms but Gravelle (1996) is unconvinced it will 
simplify the system as more pressure will be placed on transfer pricing rules. She notes that 
the first two steps would be likely to achieve compliance cost savings, but could also be 
achieved by simplifying the current system reducing complexity in income reporting for tax 
purposes. 
 
7.7 Conclusions 
 
Weisbach (2000) makes the telling point that ‘Most students of the tax law generally had the 
intuition that once details of the [HR] flat tax were spelled out, the claims of extreme 
simplicity would be discredited. The analysis here confirms this intuition. The flat tax cannot 
be as simple as claimed and still both raise revenue and not create adverse incentives. Many 
of the implementation issues in the flat tax would be extremely complex, and one can expect 
rules close to the level of detail and complexity of those in current law. The flat tax would not 
come close to living up to the prediction of postcard returns’. Feld (1995) agrees; his 
conclusion, which he describes as ‘modest’, is that ‘the flat tax cannot achieve all its goals of 
a simple statute and simple taxpayer reporting at a low uniform rate and raise the revenues 
produced under the current income tax regime’ and ‘something will give way in their 
resolution: the revenue yield, the simplicity of the tax or the simplicity of the business 
transactions…The imagination of practitioners and the need by government to preserve its 
chief revenue source will pull the statute in different directions and inevitably create 
complexity’. 
Weisbach’s (2000) specific conclusion about claims of simplicity is that ‘the regime will be 
complex and difficult to implement, although still somewhat simpler than current 
law…Without the claims of simplicity and efficiency, the argument for the Flat Tax becomes 
extremely weak’. 
This lack of simplicity is largely due to the HR flat tax, in the words of McLure and Zodrow 
(1996), containing ‘unacceptable opportunities for abuse’, and benefits such as equating the 
tax treatment of debt and equity are offset by the creation of new distortions as shown by the 
many examples above. 
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8. Experience of countries with EE flat taxes 
 
The previous two chapters have considered the largely theoretical evidence of the impact of 
introducing a flat tax upon the UK’s corporation tax legislation and compliance, considering 
especially the HR flat tax. 
This chapter briefly describes the real life flat tax systems introduced in some Eastern 
European countries. It then considers the evidence for simplification and reduction in 
compliance costs in those countries as a result of the reforms to their tax systems. While the 
EE flat tax reforms have been considered to some extent in the UK flat tax debate, analysis of 
available data has seldom been used. 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
A number of countries in Eastern Europe have introduced flat taxes which by and large follow 
Keen et al’s (2006) definition above in the last few years. The table below shows the change 
in rates for both income tax and corporation tax between the year of the reform and the 
previous year. Data is taken from Keen et al (2006) and Alvin Rabushka’s blog at 
http://flattaxes.blogspot.com  
 
 ‘Flat tax’ 
adopted 
Income tax 
rate % 
 Corporation 
tax rate % 
 
  Before After Before After 
Estonia 1994 16-33 26 35 26 
Lithuania 1994 18-33 33 29 29 
Latvia 1995 25 & 10 25 25 25 
Russia 2001 12-30 13 30 30 
Serbia 2003 10-20 14 20 14 
Ukraine 2004 10-40 13 30 25 
Slovak 
Republic 
2004 10-38 19 19 19 
Georgia 2005 12-20 12 20 20 
Romania 2005 18-40 11 25 16 
Macedonia 2007 15-24 12 15 12 
Montenegro 2007 16-24 15 15 & 20 9 
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Albania 2008 5-30 10 20 10 
Czech 
Republic 
2008 12-32 15 24 21 
Bulgaria 2008 20-24 10 10 10 
Change in tax rates observed for EE flat tax adopters (Keen et al, 2006, p6) 
The table demonstrates that the reforms were, in general, radical ones in terms of changes to 
tax rates, becoming more so with later adopters. Although an obvious point, it serves to 
highlight the importance of the concept of flat tax and its need for further study. 
Some of the more significant corporation tax reforms are considered below in more detail in 
order of date of adoption of the flat tax. 
 
8.2.1 Estonia 
 
Estonia is generally regarded as the pioneer of the EE flat tax movement. The rate of 
corporation tax has remained the same as income tax; both have been reduced consistently 
since the year of reform and are scheduled to be 20% by 2009. However, the best known 
feature of the Estonian corporation tax was not part of the initial reform but was adopted in 
2000 whereby undistributed corporate profits were untaxed and distributions (in the form of 
dividends, other profit distributions, gifts, donations, representation expenses and other 
expenses deemed unrelated to business activity) taxed at the flat rate.  
As seen in the table below, revenue from the corporation tax fell relative to GDP on 
movement to a flat tax. 
 
8.2.2 Russia 
 
Russia’s flat tax reform attracted widespread interest e.g. Gorodnichenko et al (2007), 
Sinelnikov-Mourylev et al (undated), not least because it has the largest economy of the 
reforming countries by some considerable distance, and substantial cuts in the higher 
marginal rates of income tax were concurrent with an increase in revenue collected. Debate 
ensued as to whether there was any causal link between the two. The reform was also notable 
for its significant broadening on the income tax base by elimination of exemptions, and an 
accompanying major reform in the rates for social security contributions. 
It should be noted that the Russian flat tax did not strictly meet Keen et al’s (2006) definition 
of flat tax above as the personal allowance is withdrawn with increasing income; once the 
allowance is exhausted 13% becomes the taxpayer’s average as well as marginal rate. 
The effects of the corporation tax reforms have generated less discussion than the income tax. 
In fact, under the Russian reform the corporation tax rate actually initially increased as extra 
municipal levies were allowed to be levied, increasing the rate from 30% to 35%, although 
the main corporation tax rate has now fallen to 24%.  
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Gaddy and Gale (2001) investigated the Russian 2001 tax reforms focussing on the 
observations of increasing tax revenue and GDP. They claim that Rabushka, one of the 
architects of the HR flat tax, ‘link the two repeatedly, being careful never to explicitly assert 
causation’ and HR flat tax supporters ‘often refer to the Russian example as evidence in their 
favour’. Among their conclusions is that the income tax component of the reforms bore little 
resemblance to the HR flat tax, which is supported by the observations below. Capital income 
tax was retained, another difference from a pure HR flat tax. 
Gaddy and Gale (2001) also note that income tax compliance increased significantly 
following the reform, but was more likely due to changes in administration and enforcement 
and other structural changes rather than taxpayers becoming less incentivised to undertake 
avoidance due to lower rates of tax. They describe the tax system before the reforms as 
‘primitive’ and consider that measures such as provision of ID numbers, indirect assessments, 
authorisation of tax audits and a general atmosphere of coercion were more important than 
any reduction in tax rates. Corporation tax compliance was not specifically mentioned, but 
these conclusions are still valid since a large number of EE reforms were accompanied by 
more fundamental changes to the tax system. 
Their report considers that it would also be dangerous to take improved compliance as 
evidence that the system appeared simpler for taxpayers, as the specific anti-avoidance 
measures introduced are likely to have played a significant part. However, the authors 
acknowledge that the reform did close many existing loopholes and exemptions.  
 
8.2.3 Slovak Republic 
 
The Slovak Republic was the first country to introduce an identical rate (19%) for income tax, 
corporation tax and VAT. Under law 595/2003 – Collected Laws on income tax, which 
codified the tax reform, the reform’s reduction in the corporation tax rate from 25% was 
accompanied by more rapid tax depreciation and more generous carry-forward provisions. 
This was accompanied by a major reduction in exemptions for companies including tax 
payment holidays for new companies, limits on deductibility of charitable giving and stricter 
rules for provisioning and reserves. 
The introduction of the flat tax was accompanied by a major reform of the benefits system. 
Following reform, revenue from corporation tax fell by 0.4% of GDP, but was largely offset 
by increased indirect tax receipts, mainly from VAT. 
Miklos (2005) noted ‘Many say Slovakia now has one of the simplest, most transparent and 
least distortive tax systems in the world’. This was presumably as a result of reduction in the 
number of tax rates and removal of a number of exemptions. This is a bold claim and is not 
reflected in the statistics for ease of corporation tax compliance discussed below. 
The Slovakian flat tax reform is generally accepted to be the closest of the Eastern European 
reforms to the pure HR flat tax, although it still retains significant differences from that 
theoretical model. Krajcir and Odor (2005) analysed the effects of the flat tax one year after 
its introduction. Surprisingly, the effect on compliance and administration costs was not 
analysed by the report, although it was felt that one year was too soon to obtain meaningful 
results. One possible problem identified was that of start-up costs of taxpayers becoming used 
to the new system, which could exceed past operating costs and produce distorted results. 
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Another analysis of the Slovakian flat tax reforms one year after their introduction was 
performed by Golias and Kicina (2005). As already noted, one of the aims of the reforms was 
to eliminate all exceptions, exemptions and special regimes. Their report noted that the old 
tax system included 90 exceptions, 19 sources of untaxed income, 66 tax-exempt items and 
37 items with specific tax rates, virtually all of which were abolished by the reform making 
the system ‘much simpler and transparent and eliminated speculation aimed at paying lower 
tax rates’. 
Under the reforms of corporation tax, loss treatment became more generous with the ability to 
offset taxable income for up to five years. Other reforms included the removal of tax base 
deductions for sectors such as agriculture and forestry and other investments incentives 
reduced such as abolition of tax holidays up to 10 years for new companies, serving to 
broaden the tax base. 
Golias and Kicina (2005) note that only two reforms have been analysed in the literature: 
Russia (2001) and the Slovak Republic (2004). They speculate that research on these recent 
reforms is hampered by a lack of good quality data to analyse for the period before the 
reform. 
 
8.3 Comparison of the EE flat taxes 
 
8.3.1 Differences 
 
Analysis, principally by Keen et al (2006), reveals a number of differences between the EE 
flat tax regimes: 
 
8.3.2 Rates 
 
The first wave of Baltic State reforms (Estonia to Latvia) tended to cut income tax rates to a 
level near to the existing highest marginal rate of tax, whereas the second wave commencing 
with Russia set income tax rates closer to the lowest rate. This contrast is much less clearly 
defined for corporation tax rates as can be seen in the above table. In general, cuts in 
corporation tax rates are much lower than income tax, and certainly the tax-cutting rhetoric 
seen in the flat tax debate has not tended to consider the case of companies to the same extent. 
 
8.3.3 Structural 
 
Estonia, Latvia, Slovak Republic and Romania set their rates of corporation tax and income 
tax at the same level. This serves to remove tax rate distortions over whether to conduct 
business via a company or a sole trader (there are, of course, a large number of other 
distorting factors in reaching this decision), subject to dividends and capital gains being 
untaxed. In these cases, the flat tax comes closest to the pure HR flat tax although capital 
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expenditure is still not fully expensed in the year of purchase; capital allowances are claimed 
instead. 
Other features of the HR flat tax are also not present in these EE flat taxes including taxes on 
interest income and capital gains (except Latvia where they remain exempt as before the 
reform) and the retention of a traditional destination-based VAT. 
Of the other four countries considered by Keen et al (2006), three have higher corporation tax 
than income tax rates while Lithuania does not, illustrating the range of different structures. 
All four retained withholding taxes on dividends although Russia introduced a credit against 
the personal tax liability. 
 
8.4 Comparisons with the HR flat tax 
 
It is abundantly clear, even from a cursory analysis, that the Eastern European ‘flat tax’ 
reforms bear very little resemblance to the proposals of the HR flat tax. 
Murphy (2006) has produced the following table showing how none of the EE flat tax 
systems contain all, or even a majority, of the key elements of the HR flat tax. An HR flat tax 
would answer ‘no’ to all the questions in the table. In addition, none of the flat taxes use a 
cash flow basis to calculate taxable income for corporation tax purposes and none of them 
offer immediate expensing for all business assets, two key tenets of the HR flat tax. 
Comparison of EE flat tax adopters (Murphy, 2006, p22, NK = not known) 
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Estonia Y Mainly Y Mainly N Y Y Y N 
Lithuania Y Some Y Y Y Y Y N Y 
Latvia Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y 
Russia Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y 
Serbia Y Y Y Y N N Y N Y 
Slovakia Y Y Y Y N Y N N N 
Ukraine Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Georgia Y N NK Y NK NK Y NK NK 
Romania N Y Y NK N NK NK NK NK 
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8.5 Similarities 
 
There are some features of the above EE flat taxes that have recurred to some extent directly 
affecting the corporation tax: 
• Introduction of a flat tax has often been accompanied by a reduction or elimination of 
exemptions – for example, bringing capital income into tax or eliminating preferences for 
certain groups of taxpayers or activities. It is apparently this observation that leads 
supporters of the Eastern European tax reforms to link simplification and flat taxes. 
However, data below throws into question whether any simplification at all occurred in 
these countries 
• In many cases, reform included a reduction in the corporation tax rate and was followed by 
further reductions which were larger than those in the income tax rate. In all cases, 
marginal rates of tax were reduced after reform (although not immediately for Russia) 
 
In general, however, Keen et al (2006) note that the EE flat tax reforms of recent years are 
very different in design and there is little empirical analysis which make generalisation 
possible. A few key points do emerge: 
8.5.1 Effect on revenue 
 
The following table shows corporation tax revenues before and after the flat tax reforms as a 
percentage of GDP: 
Tax revenues before and after EE flat tax reforms (Keen et al, 2006, p6) 
 Year before reform % Year after reform % 
Estonia 4.8 3.5 
Lithuania 5.3 2.5 
Latvia 2.0 2.4 
Russia 5.5 5.8 
Slovak Republic 2.8 2.4 
Ukraine 5.0 4.7 
Georgia 1.6 1.9 
Romania 2.7 2.4 
 
Flat tax has in general lead to a relative reduction in revenue from the corporation tax; 
behavioural responses may have reduced the loss but no Laffer effect of increasing revenue 
due to reduced avoidance and evasion from the lower tax rate has been observed. The reforms 
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have not funded themselves, and in many cases the gap was filled by increased revenue from 
indirect taxes. 
In the case of Russia, Ivanova et al (2001) consider that the revenue increase was due to 
strong outperformance of the whole economy, not due to the flat tax itself. The reason for the 
Georgian revenue increase is unclear. 
 
8.5.2 Compliance and simplification 
 
Ivanova et al (2001) show that income tax compliance improved in Russia, but consider that 
there is no evidence that this was due to the reform rather than concurrent changes in 
enforcement. This is nonetheless in accordance with the Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo (1999) 
findings for countries where administration is weak, so may apply to the other EE flat tax 
countries although no analysis in this area appears to have been done. 
Limited survey evidence from Russia does not suggest that the flat tax reform was seen by 
taxpayers as simplifying, and data below seems to corroborate this for other Eastern European 
countries. 
Engelschalk (2004) notes that several Eastern European countries which have introduced the 
so-called ‘flat tax’ reforms have not seen significant impacts on overall business obstacles, 
and hence presumably a reduction in compliance costs, due to non-reform of all the other 
business taxes.  
 
8.5.3 Equity 
 
Where reforms were accompanied by tax base broadening via elimination of exemptions (e.g. 
Ukraine where this was estimated to have increased GDP by one point), this is likely to have 
increased horizontal equity, efficiency gains and greater simplicity. However, this effect does 
not seem to have been studied in any of the flat tax countries. 
 
8.5.4 Sustainability of flat taxes 
 
Keen et al (2006) note that the future of EE flat taxes and their imitators remains unclear. 
They consider that the flat tax will lose the radicalism of its statement as it is easy to imitate, 
and while other states may introduce similar systems, it may not be long before one of the 
pioneers abandons it, although the reforms seem robust to date. 
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8.6 Compliance data 
 
While the reports above highlight the simplifying features of some of the EE flat tax reforms, 
they provide little in the way of data and analysis to back up these claims. It is therefore 
necessary to look for alternative sources of information, not produced as a result of flat tax 
studies, to consider the true impact of the reform in the areas of interest in this thesis. 
 
8.6.1 Corruption analysis 
 
PwC and the World Bank (2006) produced a report which appeared to imply that flat tax 
reforms which simplified existing tax regimes by cutting rates and exemptions reduced 
corruption in tax administration. Georgia saw a fall in perceived corruption of tax officials 
from 44% in 2002 down to 11% in 2005 – the greatest fall in the survey of 27 transition 
economies. Romania and Slovakia, also flat tax reformers, saw falls from 14% to 8% and 
11% to 5% respectively. 
However, as already discussed, such results should be treated with caution especially when 
trying to make a causal link between the two. Other factors such as increased promotion of a 
culture of compliance, as seen in Russia, and noted above, are very likely to be of 
significance. 
 
8.6.2 Compliance time 
 
The PwC and World Bank report (2006) also investigated compliance time differences 
between countries by considering the number of tax payments made per year and the number 
of hours spent complying per year for corporation tax for a sample small, manufacturing 
company. Data on tax payments and compliance times was collected from the local PwC 
office. The size of the company was adjusted to allow meaningful comparisons to be made 
between countries. 
On first principles, a country with a simple tax system would be expected to show low 
compliance times and a small number of tax payments. One would therefore expect to see 
countries with flat tax systems, if the claims of simplification attributed to flat tax are correct, 
to rank highly on both counts compared to countries without such systems. 
The report acknowledges that for Romania and Ukraine ‘flat rate corporate profits taxes have 
been introduced, but the number of payments required and the contribution of other taxes are 
so significant and so mitigate the perceived benefits of the flat tax system’. These two 
countries are among the bottom four countries in the world with the highest number of tax 
payments required to be made by a company in the year. This conclusion appears to hold for 
most of the other EE flat tax countries. 
The study was repeated for the year ended 31 December 2007. Data for the EE flat tax 
countries is shown below, with the UK and USA (neither of which have flat tax systems) 
included for comparison purposes. 
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Effects on compliance for EE flat tax adopters (PwC/World Bank, 2009, p76-81) 
 
Country CIT 
payments 
Total tax 
payments 
Payments 
ranking 
CIT hours 
to comply 
Total hours 
to comply 
Time 
ranking 
Estonia 1 10 26 20 81 17 
Lithuania 2 15 44 32 166 58 
Latvia 1 7 7 31 279 117 
Russia 1 22 70 160 448 155 
Serbia 12 66 172 48 279 117 
Ukraine 6 99 178 186 848 172 
Slovakia 1 31 94 61 325 129 
Georgia 4 30 92 140 387 145 
Romania 4 113 181 32 202 74 
Macedonia 12 40 127 25 75 11 
Montenegro 12 89 177 43 372 141 
Albania 13 44 140 120 244 95 
Czech Rep 1 12 33 150 930 174 
Bulgaria 2 17 52 40 616 167 
UK 1 8 10 35 105 24 
USA 2 10 26 99 187 65 
 
Total tax payments and hours to comply refer to a country’s entire tax system covering all 
taxes. 181 countries were include in the survey. The ranking position in the survey reflects the 
total tax payments and total hours to comply to give a fuller measure of a country’s overall 
tax system rather than solely considering corporation tax. The data is shown below in pictoral 
form. 
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Tax payments made and compliance times for EE flat tax adopters (PwC/World Bank, 2009, p76-81) 
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Such data should be treated with extreme caution given the highly artificial scenario and the 
potential for not comparing like with like. However, a few useful general observations can be 
made: 
 
8.6.2.1 Number of tax payments 
 
This is a measure of compliance costs incurred by companies under their particular tax 
system. The EE flat tax countries do not compare particularly favourably to other countries in 
the world without flat tax systems in terms of the number of payments that have to be made. It 
is also clear from the data that many countries with an EE flat tax have very inefficient 
payment structures with high numbers of payments required each year. Indeed, Romania 
actually has the highest number of payments of all countries sampled in the world. The UK 
has a lower number of payments than all the EE flat tax countries apart from Latvia. 
 
8.6.2.2 Number of hours to comply 
 
Again, flat tax countries show no evidence of reduced compliance times compared to 
countries with progressive systems. The UK has less onerous compliance time requirements 
than all except Estonia and Macedonia. 
The accuracy of some of the data should be treated with caution with some surprising results 
such as Macedonia’s small number of compliance hours compared to its very large number of 
payments required. On first principles, one would expect a high number of payments to 
require a large amount of compliance time to process. Nevertheless, no evidence of 
simplification is clear to see. 
 
8.6.2.3 UK and USA tax systems 
 
In passing, it should be noted that both the UK and USA tax systems score favourably in the 
survey for both number of payments and compliance times compared to the rest of the world. 
Arguments that the UK’s tax system is excessively complex rarely make reference to such 
data, which may force a revaluation of such criticisms. 
 
8.6.3 Introduction of a flat tax 
 
A further interesting extension to the analysis of the data is to consider the effect upon 
compliance times and number of payments required on the introduction of an EE flat tax 
system. Macedonia and Montenegro are relevant cases in that their flat tax systems were 
introduced during 2007 (1/1/07 for Macedonia, 1/7/07 for Montenegro), so comparison of this 
data to that from earlier reports might be expected to show any impact of the new flat tax 
system. 
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In the case of Montenegro, there is no change in either total number of tax payments or total 
hours to comply in 2007 compared to 2006 apart from a single extra tax payment, so the new 
flat tax appears to have had no impact upon compliance. However, 2006 shows a significant 
increase in both quantities over the equivalent 2005 data. It is not clear why this increase in 
compliance time is the case, or whether the introduction of a flat tax can really have had so 
little impact. The reliability of the data may be an issue with the possibility of the local PwC 
office simply returning the prior year figures to the survey without undertaking a proper 
review. 
Macedonia does show an improvement from 2006 to 2007 in both number of tax payments 
(falling from 52 to 40) and total hours to comply (96 falling to 75). Whether this fall can be 
attributed to the new flat tax as opposed to other factors is not clear; no studies have yet been 
performed so the trend must be treated with extreme care. However, it does at least provide 
some justification for simplification, and the 2005 figures are very similar to those of 2006, as 
might be expected with similar tax systems in place. 
 
 
 
Country CIT 
payments 
Total tax 
payments 
Payments 
ranking 
CIT hours 
to comply 
Total hours 
to comply 
Time 
ranking 
2007       
Macedonia 12 40 127 25 75 11 
Montenegro 12 89 177 43 372 141 
2006       
Macedonia 12 52 148 30 96 17 
Montenegro 12 88 173 43 372 137 
2005       
Macedonia 12 54  30 96  
Montenegro 12 75  16 208  
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Tax payments made and compliance times for Macedonia and Montenegro (PwC/World Bank, 2009, 
p76-81) 
 
The above data comparisons are extremely brief, but still provide a compelling case that many 
of the tax systems of the EE flat tax countries are very complex and compare unfavourably in 
this respect to the progressive tax systems of the UK. Such a result should not be surprising 
for, as noted by the many commentators already quoted e.g. Krajcir and Odor (2005), simply 
changing a tax rate will have little impact on the much deeper, inherent complexity of a 
national tax system.  
 
8.7 Conclusion 
 
It is very difficult to draw any clear conclusions about the introduction of the EE flat taxes. 
The chief reason for this situation is the lack of clear data comparing the situation in the 
relevant countries before and after the reforms. This is extremely surprising as simplification 
of the tax system is often given as a driver of the reforms. While it may be acknowledged that 
data might be difficult to collect and that a greater timescale is needed to draw any firm 
conclusions, in the absence of evidence to the contrary it may be inferred that any 
simplification effects were minimal, as predicted by commentators including Keen et al 
(2006). The limited data available suggests that EE flat tax countries have tax systems which 
are complex and time-consuming to comply with. 
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9. UK Case Study : The 2008 Capital Gains Tax (CGT) Reform  
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
One of the most significant issues in the UK flat tax debate, as already mentioned, is that no economy 
of a similar size and complexity to that of the UK has ever introduced any form of flat tax. As a result, 
the debate has remained largely theoretical with only very limited real life data for either side used to 
back up their arguments. 
However, during the preparation of this thesis, an extremely significant event occurred in the UK, 
when the government announced a major and unexpected reform to the capital gains tax (CGT) 
system. Under its proposals, a flat tax rate of 18% would be introduced and a complicated exemption 
in the form of taper relief abolished, a genuinely simplifying move. 
Although CGT is a relatively minor tax in terms of revenue raised, and the focus of this thesis is on 
corporation tax, the reform was nonetheless of great interest, chiefly because of the response of parties 
who had previously been calling for simplification of the UK tax system. 
 
9.2 CGT reform in the UK 
 
On 9 October 2007 the UK Chancellor, Alistair Darling, announced an unexpected reform to the UK 
CGT system, effectively proposing a flat tax rate of 18% on capital gains for individuals and 
unincorporated businesses. The proposal was without doubt a simplifying one as it removed the need 
for complex calculations of taper relief, which reduced a capital gain depending on the number of 
years of ownership of the asset, as well as whether the asset had been used for ‘business’ purposes. 
The result was a range of effective CGT rates from 5% to 40%. 
Taper relief was originally introduced by the incoming Labour government to encourage 
entrepreneurship and create jobs. Endacott (2008) notes that the government was influenced by US 
thinking, including a study of the venture capital industry by Gompers and Lerner (1998) which 
highlighted a negative correlation between a CGT rate and the magnitude of venture capital 
investment. It should, however, be noted that the report noted that the tax rate was only one of several 
factors to consider and described it as a ‘blunt instrument’. 
However, the legislative provisions for taper relief were lengthy and complex. The concept of a 
‘business asset’ was chosen to promote active risk-taking rather than passive investment, but its 
definition was complex and often apparently arbitrary. The far more generous relief that such assets 
attracted compared to ‘non-business assets’ was in some cases very hard to justify. In addition, the 
increasing relief depending on the length of time the asset was held was criticised by some as 
introducing arbitrary time limits to distort investment decisions. 
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9.3 ‘Flat tax’ connection 
 
It was somewhat ironic that the UK government introduced the proposed reforms using some of the 
rhetoric of supporters of ‘flat tax’ e.g. Heath (2006), especially in regard to simplification of the tax 
system. While the US has a long and distinguished history of flat tax debate, the concept is much 
newer in the UK and has met with little favour to date in government circles. HM Treasury produced 
a critical report in 2005, mainly on equity grounds, and the debate largely subsided. 
Admittedly, the proposed UK CGT reforms bore little resemblance to the original flat tax model of 
Hall and Rabushka and its subsequent development in the US. Under their HR flat tax model, capital 
gains are not taxed at all. However, useful comparisons can still be made as to how the flatness of a 
tax rate impacts upon the simplicity of the underlying tax system. 
In addition, it should be noted that the 2005 Treasury report highlighted the fact that no flat tax system 
had been introduced in an economy similar to the UK, so any conclusions about its effectiveness 
would be largely speculative. While CGT is a minor tax in terms of the revenue it raises, such a 
comment is now a less valid one. 
The connection between the reform and the flat tax debate was not discussed in any detail at the time 
of the reform, and its most significant mention to date was in a paper presented at the 2009 IRS 
Annual Research Conference in Washington DC (Jelfs and Lymer, 2009). 
 
9.4 Taxpayer response 
 
Given the purported desire for tax simplification in the UK (NAO, 2007b), it might have been 
expected that this proposal would have met with a broadly favourable response from taxpayers and 
their advisers. However, the exact opposite occurred. The reforms were bitterly denounced by 
representatives of small business, principally on the basis that under the old system, many of their 
constituents would have expected to pay a rate of no more than 10% on disposal of shares in their 
companies (Truman, 2008). Emotive phrases such as ‘80% tax rise’ succeeded in attracting much 
media attention. Simplification proved to be a principle readily sacrificed to avoid even a modest tax 
increase, with the General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress describing the Chancellor as 
having ‘called the bluff of those business leaders who have long called for tax simplicity’. 
Other arguments from the reform’s opponents included the need for stability in a tax system, the 
damage to the country’s entrepreneurial culture with the prospect of wealth generators choosing to set 
up business in lower tax jurisdictions and the prospect of a ‘finance gap’, deterring external investors 
from financially supporting small businesses (Endacott, 2008). 
The behaviour of tax practitioners in response to the reform was predictable. After initial complaints 
that the reforms had not undergone a proper consultation process, a number of schemes were devised 
for clients based on draft contracts of sale dated before 6 April 2008 (the date the reforms took effect) 
to take advantage of the lower tax rates under the previous regime. This pragmatic approach was 
demonstrated in the actions of the prominent tax consultant Kevin Slevin who was quick to denounce 
the reform as ‘the Darling Raid on small businesses’, yet by 17 July 2008 he had written the first book 
to market on the subject of entrepreneurs’ relief, available for sale to fellow practitioners. 
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9.5 Government reaction 
 
In the event, the Government gave in to the reform’s critics and introduced further legislation known 
as entrepreneurs’ relief, based on repealed legislation known as ‘retirement relief’. This effectively 
gave taxpayers the ability to continue to pay only 10% on the first £1 million of capital gains with any 
excess taxed at 18%.  
From a simplification point of view, this response was disastrous leading to greater volume of tax law 
and maintaining the complexity of calculating a capital gain. As with taper relief, with which it shares 
a number of similarities while not providing as generous a relief, entrepreneurs’ relief creates 
distortions and influences investment behaviour. Endacott (2008) points out that the relief introduces 
substantial complexity for the small amount of relief it provides. The Chartered Institute of Taxation, 
the representative body for chartered tax advisers, noted that retirement relief provisions, which 
formed the basis for entrepreneurs’ relief, contained elements that were ‘notoriously difficult to apply 
and, in practice, gave rise to a number of problems for both taxpayers and HMRC’. 
 
9.6 Conclusions 
 
In summary, the recent experiences of the CGT reforms provide evidence of the difficulty any 
government would face in trying to introduce significant simplification to the UK tax system, be it by 
flat tax or any other means, given the response to proposals to modify one minor tax. They also show 
that, even if a simple tax system could be introduced, the pressures for special interest groups may be 
too much for government to ignore, leading to further legislation and increased complexity, a fact 
noted by US commentators on the HR flat tax e.g. Feld (1995). 
The reforms would also appear to demonstrate that taxpayer support for simplification of the UK’s tax 
legislation, and indeed the tax system in general, is somewhat overstated by published studies e.g. 
Tenon (2005), NAo (2007b).The response would suggest that the rate of tax at which a taxpayer must 
pay is the more important consideration for him. 
Whilst not providing any evidence per se for the effect of a flat tax on the UK tax system, the political 
considerations and impact, which given that tax reform is driven by government is of critical 
importance, may suggest that introduction of a more comprehensive flat tax system in the UK is 
unlikely to happen in the near future. 
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Conclusion 
 
The introduction of a flat tax in the UK would appear to produce a few simplifying features 
for the current corporation tax system. Both EE and HR flat taxes may offer a broader tax 
base and the removal of bracket arbitrage as a means of avoidance. The HR flat tax has some 
additional simplifying features including the removal of capital/income distinctions and 
immediate expensing of business assets. 
Compliance cost modelling also appears to show some simplification may be possible on 
introduction of a flat tax. HR flat tax studies from the US e.g. Hall (1996) and Slemrod (1996) 
predict a substantial reduction in costs. Western European studies on EE flat taxes (Fuest, 
2007) predict a modest decrease in compliance costs. 
However, the evidence for no significant overall simplification is far greater in quantity and is 
drawn from a variety of sources. Compelling cases can be made both that little genuine 
simplification would occur, and that the flat tax in question would generate additional 
complexity on its introduction. There is a substantial amount of academic work on the 
subject; early work in the USA on the HR flat tax , notably by Weisbach (2000) and Feld 
(1995), identifies a number of flaws in its design that would lead to the necessary generation 
of tax system complexity to avoid significant revenue loss from tax avoidance schemes. In 
addition, considerable obstacles in the form of transition tax and political pressure are 
identified as major stumbling blocks to an HR flat tax introduction. 
The simplifying benefits of EE flat taxes have also been questioned. Theoretical work in the 
UK by Martin (2005) predicts little legislative simplification on introduction. This work is 
reinforced by the lack of any significant simplification seen on introduction of the EE flat 
taxes (Keen et al, 2006), as well as the results of the proposed UK CGT reforms. 
Compliance cost studies predicting substantial reductions remain controversial. 
Commentators such as Gravelle (1996) note that such studies are based on weak data, and 
their conclusions appear to be inconsistent with evidence suggesting little simplification 
would occur and extra complexity would be generated by the introduction of flat taxes. 
Such scepticism on the issue of compliance costs appears to be backed up by the results of 
brief studies of real-life EE flat tax systems. The overriding conclusion from the data, as 
collated by PwC and the World Bank (2005-8) is that countries with flat tax systems do not 
necessarily have simpler tax systems than those countries without. The complexity of a tax 
system appears to be a property with far more variables than simply the number of rates of 
tax. The limited data available suggests that the UK’s tax system is not overly complex 
compared to the rest of the world, which could be a significant (and rarely quoted) 
observation. 
The recently attempted CGT reforms in the UK appear to demonstrate further the critical 
issue of political considerations when considering tax reform and cast doubt upon the relative 
importance of simplification in such reforms, both for government and taxpayers. 
In summary, the claim that flat tax is a force for simplification appears to have very little 
foundation. At first glance, this might seem a surprising conclusion, given the apparent 
importance of the issue of simplification and the fact that flat tax supporters still use reduction 
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of complexity as a supporting argument for their preferred tax structure. However, the 
unwillingness of such supporters to refer to work performed on both HR and EE flat taxes in 
support of their simplification claims may mean this conclusion is easier to understand. 
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